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Editor’s Note
This issue of Space & Defense enriches
our collaboration with USSTRATCOM’s
Deterrence & Assurance Academic Alliance
(https://www.stratcom.mil/Academic-Alliance/).
DAAA cultivates a network of leading
universities with faculty and students interested in
contributing analysis and solutions to problems of
deterrence in the 21st century. Given the USAFA
Eisenhower Center’s heritage exploring space
politics and policy, we found extraordinarily
productive overlap between the editorial ambition
of this Eisenhower Center journal and DAAA’s
mission. To enable future joint efforts, prior to
publication, we welcomed Dr. Michelle Black,
former USSTRATCOM civilian, cofounder of the
Academic Alliance, and current assistant
professor of Political Science at the University of
Nebraska, Omaha, to our editorial board.
Our lead article this issue, “China’s Military
Space Strategy,” by Sam Rouleau, 2Lt, USAF,
applies concepts from political-economy to glean
insights on the roots and future direction of China
space. The field of political-economy is routinely
concerned with the role of ideas in shaping
material incentives for state actors. Rouleau
analyzes the Marxist dialectic from Chinese
Communist Party ideology and traces how such
an important belief system within the Chinese
leadership ought to affect investment in space
capabilities. Rouleau’s article is straight from our
customary mold at Space & Defense. It also
touches upon academic interests at STRATCOM
in cross-domain deterrence.
Subsequent articles in this issue address questions
of interest to DAAA that travel beyond the
technical confines of space policy to include cyber
and nuclear decisions. Two of the articles, by
Timothy Goines, Maj., USAF and myself, on
cyber and cross-domain deterrence, respectively,
were in fact presented at the Academic Alliance’s

annual tabletop exercise and workshop in March
2018. This issue’s third feature article, by SaintClair Lima da Silva, Col, Brazil Air Force (AFB),
presents comparative research, again in a
political-economy context, investigating how state
inculcated ideas of sovereign autonomy provide
an unconventional yet superior explanation to that
of regional power rivalry when analyzing drivers
for Brazil’s nuclear program during the 19701980s.
Finally, we are pleased to feature the return of our
“Student Voice” section, also aligned with DAAA
goals. Laura Olson, 2d Lt, USAF (USAFA ’17)
won the Political Science honor society Pi Sigma
Alpha’s Best Undergraduate Class Paper Award
in June 2017. Her study, part of her capstone
experience at the U.S. Air Force Academy,
synthesized public opinion data and media content
analysis to demonstrate significant gaps in
correlation between media framing and American
support for post-Cold War uses of force in
Kosovo (1999) and Syria (2012-2016). In 2Lt
Olson’s case, as is true for all our authors,
contributions herein are academic and do not
represent official policy or opinion of the U.S. Air
Force.
Consistent with President Eisenhower’s legacy of
critical thinking on space and national security,
and lining up with deterrence and assurance
research priorities of the STRATCOM Academic
Alliance, we ask new faculty and student voices to
speak up as they tackle thorny problems. Our
type of defense challenge often affects multiple
actors while weaving together political and
economic as well as military dimensions of power
at the frontiers of defense policy.

Damon Coletta
USAFA
February 2019

Article

China’s Military Space Strategy:
A Dialectical Materialism Perspective
Sam Rouleau
China’s military space strategy accommodates in significant ways the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s)
ideological commitment to dialectical materialism. This Marxian commitment persists and manifests in
China’s investment in space power despite the Party’s widely acknowledged development of state
capitalism to guide China’s economy.

CHINA’S MILITARY SPACE
STRATEGY
The trajectory of humankind changed
on 4 October 1957 when the Soviet Union
launched Sputnik, becoming the first nation to
successfully enter the space domain. 1 Since
1957, space technology has developed
rapidly, as we have continued to push the
boundaries of space exploration. In the 21st
century, space technology forms the
foundation for modern communication,
navigation, and warfighting capability.
Without space, modern society would be
denied GPS technology, and militaries would
be unable to establish global communications,
perform satellite reconnaissance, or execute
precision strikes. In many ways, the space
domain will be increasingly vital to the
national interest and international politics
moving forward.
China’s recent economic success provides a
strong bulwark on which to build their space
capability. Throughout the 1990s, China’s
GDP grew at an outstanding rate of no less
than seven percent annually. 2 Current
projections have the Chinese economy
1

Sam Rouleau is Second Lieutenant in the United
States Air Force and Class of ’17 at the U.S. Air Force
Academy.
2
Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin
Books, 2011), 479.

surpassing the U.S. and holding forty percent
of global GDP by 2040. 3 The economic
success of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) will allow for commitment and
progress in the pursuit of advanced space
technology.
China has identified space as integral to
achieving national prosperity and security.
More specifically, Liu Yanjun, Wan Shuixian,
Li Daguang, and Guo Tong from the National
Defense University write in their work, On
Space Dominance, that space holds the key to
political, economic, and military security. 4
Space capability can be a powerful diplomatic
tool. For example, during the Berlin Crisis,
the United States used the Samos 2
photoreconnaissance satellite to determine
that the Soviet Union had no combat ready
ballistic missiles, undermining Nikita
Khrushchev’s stated position that the missile
gap between the Soviets and the Americans
was insurmountable, forcing Khrushchev to
soften his stance and compromise. 5 The
Chinese view this early utilization of space
technology as a foundational example of how
space technology can strengthen China’s
diplomacy, placing them in a stronger
negotiating position. In other words, space
3

Joseph Nye Jr., The Future of Power (New York:
Public Affairs, 2011), 184.
4
Liu Yanjun, Wan Shuixian, Li Daguang, Guo Tong,
On Space Dominance (Beijing: National Defense
University, 2003), 1, 3, 8.
5
Ibid., 3.
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enables the national information system,
which strengthens diplomatic capacity and
propagates political proposals, opinions, and
ideology. 6
In the economic realm, China asserts that
space holds promise for economic prosperity.
Regarding resources, the People’s Republic of
China is cognizant of the potential
implications of the unique treasures found
beyond Earth’s atmosphere, such as potential
energy sources and the potential for new
biotechnologies, believing that new
technologies will become economically
profitable. 7 Additionally, China intertwines
the future of humanity with the future of the
space domain: “the population that Earth can
sustain has a limit, and sooner or later
mankind will set forth the proposition to
expand living space into outer space.
Therefore, in the 21st Century, mankind’s
reliance on space aviation technology will be
similar to mankind’s reliance on electricity
and petroleum.” 8 If the potential of the space
domain is harnessed properly, they conclude
that consequent economic growth will raise
the standard of living throughout China and
strengthen China’s international position by
fortifying their economy. 9 The dynamism that
space can bring to labor, capital, production,
and markets is another example of why China
believes that space power contributes to
ensuring national survivability. 10

4

“mankind’s demands on the realm of space
have continually increased, and have led to a
further strengthening of the trend toward the
militarization of space.” 11 In general, the
Chinese military and Communist Party
believe that space will be the domain that
dictates victory in future wars, because “in the
21st century, possessing the vantage point of
outer space will to a very large degree allow
control of the progress and conclusion of
war.” 12 Space’s considerable impact on
warfare reinforces the political and economic
justification for why a strong space capability
is paramount to China’s interest and
development.
After prevailing in the Cold War against the
Soviet Union, the United States now finds
itself joined by the People’s Republic of
China as a preeminent player on the
international stage. As outlined above, the
governing Communist Party of China (CPC)
is committed to developing their space
capabilities to ensure China’s place on the
world stage and survival of the Party. The
experience of the United States during the
Cold War offers historical insight into how to
better understand the foundation of China’s
military space strategy.

Space’s past and potential impact on military
capability is also of significant interest to
China. As China observed the Cold War
competition between America and the Soviet
Union, they concluded that space was the
deciding factor and would be in the future:

Specifically, Dr. Andrew Marshall’s work on
understanding Soviet strategy outlines a
promising framework of how to enhance
America’s awareness of China’s approach to
the space domain. Before Andrew Marshall’s
arrival at the Pentagon, Department of
Defense assessments of Soviet military power
were strictly based on quantitative methods. 13
However, Marshall’s approach to net
assessment held that quantitative comparisons

6

12

Ibid., 4.
Ibid., 4, 7.
8
Ibid., 4.
9
Ibid., 8.
10
Ibid., 8.
11
Yanjun, Shuixian, Daguang, and Tong, On Space
Dominance, 19.
7

Ibid., 9.
Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry Watts, The Last
Warrior Andrew Marshall and the Shaping of Modern
American Defense Strategy (New York, NY: Basic
Books, 2015), 171.
13
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must “capture qualitative differences between
the opposing men and equipment,” and that it
was necessary to “incorporate differences in
training, tactics, military doctrine, campaign
strategy, and theater objectives.” 14 Marshall’s
approach directly contributed to the end of the
Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union.
Although the Soviets had put themselves
under economic stress, “Marshall’s insights
into the true burden enabled him to provide
Weinberger, Iklé, and many others with a
more accurate and nuanced assessment of
how the long-term competition with the
Soviets was going and whether deterrence
was likely to hold.” 15 Marshall understood
that strategy and policy are influenced by
more than a few factors. By understanding
Soviet approaches to training, tactics, and
military doctrine, he was able to better assess
Soviet military strength and the Soviet-U.S.
competition and conflict. In this same way,
understanding Chinese thought and
perspective is fundamental to forming sound
long-term strategy for the United States.
The context in which the Chinese understand
space has evolved along with the evolution of
the space domain itself. However, dialectical
materialism, the philosophical grounding of
the CPC, influences their thinking, including
military space theory and strategy. China has
concluded that humankind has begun an
inevitable transition to the Age of
Information, where victory in conflict and the
international realm will be determined by
which nation can most adeptly obtain, protect,
and exploit knowledge and information.
Space will be the method by which
information dominance can be gained and
“will be the decisive factor for victory in
warfare.” 16 Dialectical materialism is not the
only lens through which China’s military
14

Ibid., 184.
Ibid., 190.
16
Li Daguang, On Space Warfare (Beijing: Military
Science Publishing House, 2001), 367.
15

space posturing can be understood; however,
the dialectical materialist perspective provides
essential insight into the foundations of
China’s military space doctrine that American
policymakers and strategists must consider.
DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM
Dialectical materialism is the
philosophy and world view that was
established by Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels and served as the foundation for
Marxism. Marx and Engels rejected idealism
in favor of materialism. Marx describes his
“materialist conception of history” as starting
from “the proposition that production of the
means to support human life and, next to
production, the exchange of things produced,
is the basis of all social structure…The final
causes of all social changes and political
revolutions are to be sought, not in men’s
brains, not in men’s better insights into
eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the
modes of production and exchange.” 17 In
Marx and Engels’ view, understanding must
be grounded in real, or material, conditions.
The original term dialectics was coined by
G.W.F. Hegel in a response to the abstractive
view of metaphysics. Hegel specifically
opposed metaphysical abstractive thought
because it viewed objects as having set
identities and characteristics. 18 In Hegel’s
mind, dialectical thought defines concepts
based on interrelationship and interaction, so
ideas are defined based on this constant
evolving notion of relationship. Dialectical
thought is especially important when two
ideas seem to contradict one another, and this
contradiction drives understanding of the

17

T. Borodulina, On Historical Materialism: A
Collection (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976).
18
Ibid.
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world. 19 In essence, dialectical materialists
look to the material world to discover the
nature of contradictions that serve as the force
of change in the world and seek to determine
the laws that govern and describe this change.
Since Mao-Tse Tung, the CPC has relied on
dialectical materialism as the foundation of its
approach to domestic and international
affairs. While each leader of the CPC since
Mao has emphasized different policies for
China, they all agree on the main
contradiction that China is facing. Currently,
“the main overall contradiction is the
contradiction between the societal needs of
the people and the ability of the CPC to
provide for them.” 20 The focus of the CPC is
inherently pointed inward, as the main
contradiction has the potential to destroy the
Party’s rule if it goes unaddressed.
Essentially, resolving the main contradiction
holds the key to the longevity of the Chinese
populace, the CPC maintains that the Party
can still save China, making the interests of
the Party akin to those of the Chinese state:
“Safeguarding the core and its authority is the
highest interest of the entire party, and the
entire country and nation.” 21
While the foundational contradiction in
China’s dialectical materialist perspective is
grounded in the domestic realm, the CPC also
applies this dialectical thinking to the
international environment. Although Marx’s
initial thoughts on class conflict, which were
derived from dialectical materialism, were
centered on individuals and small collectives,
he concluded that class conflict had already
19

GWF. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. S.W. Dyde
(Ontario: Batoche Books, 2001).
20
John T. Banks, "Questions on China Space
Strategy," e-mail message to author, April 15, 2017.
(John Banks is a Senior Analyst at Leidos).
21
Chris Buckley, "China's Communist Party Declares
Xi Jingping 'Core' Leader," The New York Times,
October 27, 2016, accessed May 1, 2017,

6

and would continue to evolve into national
and global political forces. 22 Just as class
conflict informs domestic policy in China, the
competition between the CPC and the United
States can be viewed as driven by class
conflict as well. This is reflected by the
asymmetry of technological capability in the
space domain between China and America.
The CPC has determined that the main
contradiction “in the event of war is the
contradiction between the high technological
level of the U.S. forces and the relatively low
technological level of Chinese forces.” 23 As a
result, China has focused on modernizing
their military in an attempt to resolve this
contradiction, which has been illustrated by
China’s strategy of Anti-Access/Area Denial
(A2/AD).
The space domain promises to contribute to
the resolution of both the main contradiction
of the CPC and the contradiction between the
United States and China. The promise of
space is immense, and Ning Wangrong and
Ling Chunhui even go as far as to argue that
“one can even predict that the next industrial
revolution will be conducted in space.” 24 This
transition from material means of production
to advanced technology and a focus on
concentrating knowledge will propel
humanity into the Age of Information. Given
the perspective of the CPC that the space
domain offers an opportunity to revolutionize
the economy, properly developing space
capability would significantly contribute to
the ability of the CPC to provide for the
societal needs of the Chinese population.

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/world/asia/xijinping-china.html?_r=0.
22
R.J. Rummel, Understanding Conflict and War:
Volume 3 Conflict in Perspective (Beverly Hills
California: Sage Publications, 1977), Chapter 5.
23
Ibid.
24
Ning Wangrong and Ling Chunhui, Space
Confrontation, 2nd ed. (Beijing: Junshi Yiwen Press,
2010), ix.

7

Space & Defense

Viewed from the context of Chinese and
American military capability, the space
domain will once again play a significant role
in resolving this contradiction. The command
of space offers the promise of “effectively
control[ing] other nations” both militarily and
politically. 25 Because space has the potential
to alleviate the main contradiction within the
People’s Republic of China and elevate
China’s international standing, the CPC is
committed to its development moving
forward.
HISTORY OF THE SPACE DOMAIN
Although China was not directly
involved in the early Space Race, their
historical view of the development of the
space environment, space technology, and its
impact on military confrontation is
foundational to their current view of space.
Generally, Chinese space history analysts
separate the development of the space domain
into three periods: the initial period, the
middle period, and modern day space
operations. 26

examples of space operations in the initial
period. The Yom Kippur War is highlighted
because it is the first time in which space
information assistance was used to directly
support combat operations. During this
conflict, the United States and Soviet Union
employed a total of thirty-four reconnaissance
satellites. 29 Satellite capability facilitated the
initial success of the Egyptian and Syrian
militaries. Specifically, Soviet intelligence
gave Egypt and Syria the knowledge of
Israel’s weaknesses in the Bar Lev defensive
line and how to avoid American
reconnaissance satellites. 30 Soon after, the
United States Big Bird reconnaissance
satellites noticed a ten kilometer gap between
Egypt’s second and third army groups, giving
Israeli forces the knowledge to launch a
counter attack that resulted in Israel regaining
the initiative in the conflict. 31 Space
operations in the initial period were an
extension of other military capabilities, and
space characteristics during this time period
can be described as: “indirect confrontation,
fairly small operational means and scale,
rather low operational effectiveness, and
single strategic operational goals.” 32

Jia Jun Ming, a colonel in the People’s
Liberation Army and professor at the National
Defense University in Beijing, focuses on the
historical evolution of space’s role in military
conflict. He defines the initial period of space
operations as the 1960s and 1970s. 27 During
this time, space operations generally consisted
of “information assistance and support.” 28 In
addition to mentioning satellite technology’s
role in resolving the Berlin Crisis of 1961 on
favorable terms for the United States, Jia Jun
Ming also offers the Cuban Missile Crisis and
the Fourth Middle East War as additional

The middle period, which occurred during the
1980s and early 1990s, witnessed the
maturation of “indirect confrontational” space
operations. 33 From a technology development
standpoint, the United States improved upon
military communication capability through
the MILSTAR Program, which also had the
goals of establishing a strategic
communication system that could resist
jamming and could survive nuclear
warfare. 34Additionally, America focused on
early warning capability and launched the

25

30

26

31

Ibid., ix.
Jia Jun Ming, On Space Operations (Beijing:
National Defense University Press, 2002), 2.
27
Ibid., 2.
28
Jun Ming, On Space Operations, 2.
29
Ibid., 3.

Wangrong and Chunhui, Space Confrontation, 25.
Ibid., 25.
32
Jun Ming, On Space Operations, 4.
33
Ibid., 4.
34
Ibid., 5.
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Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites.
Unfortunately, the limitations of the DSP
were exposed during the Gulf War, because it
was not able to provide adequate warning
time for theater tactical missile defense.
Nonetheless, the DSP led to refinement of
early warning systems. 35 Another trend was
the simplification of space equipment with a
focus on miniaturization. Lastly, President
Reagan’s Star Wars Program and America’s
commitment to both National and Theater
Missile Defense Systems revolutionized space
warfare, shifting the focus of space military
technology from a tactical to strategic level.
The Malvinas Islands War, Kosovo Conflict,
and the Gulf War all illustrate the maturation
of space’s role in warfare. At the outbreak of
the Malvinas Islands War, the United States
supported the United Kingdom with twentyfour reconnaissance satellites to provide the
British with accurate, current military
intelligence. 36 The Soviets provided similar
support to Argentina by mobilizing thirtyseven satellites of their own. Both sides were
effective, as the British were able to sink the
Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano, and
Argentina was able to sink the Sheffield, a
British destroyer. 37 The Kosovo conflict was
characterized by similar types of operations
and also saw a large prevalence of precision
guided munitions.
The Gulf War is commonly referred to
as the “first outer space war.” 38 The
multinational effort to fight against Saddam
Hussein was held together by American space
operations which provided “fully systematic
reconnaissance, early warning and detection,
command and control, communications,
navigation and positioning, and

meteorological services.” 39 It was such a
success that America proclaimed the integral
role of space assets. General Thomas S.
Moorman Jr., commander of Air Force Space
Command during the Gulf War, stated,
“Operation Desert Storm was a watershed in
the history of the military applications and
development of outer space; it was the first
time that outer space systems were
comprehensively used in a military conflict,
and it had a crucial impact on the outcome of
the war.” 40 China paid close attention to the
role of space assets and how they were
employed during the Gulf War and agreed
with General Moorman’s assessment,
concluding that “indirectly confrontational
space information warfare not only directly
served strategic goals but also went deep into
the campaign and combat spheres…it had
begun to manifest certain characteristics of a
campaign.” 41
After the hi-tech local wars of the 1990s, the
descriptions tend to become more
generalized. For example, the Chinese space
analysts agree that the current phase of space
development is the “completion of
maturation.” 42 In addition to the continued
development of technology, the early stages
of the 21st century witnessed a renewed focus
on space operational theory and
organizational layout. 43 The Schriever Space
Exercises in 2001 directly demonstrated this
point for the Chinese. What separated this
particular space warfare exercise was that the
space domain was treated as “an important
means of deterrence in an informationized
age” and that the hypothetical operations
included elements of satellite warfare. 44 The
Chinese consider the Schriever Space

35

41

36

42

Ibid., 5.
Wangrong and Chunhui, Space Confrontation, 25.
37
Ibid., 26.
38
Wangrong and Chunhui, Space Confrontation, 28.
39
Ibid., 29.
40
Ibid., 29.
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Jun Ming, On Space Operations, 7.
Yanjun, Shuixian, Daguang, and Tong, On Space
Dominance, 263.
43
Ibid., 264.
44
Daguang, On Space Warfare, 288.
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Simulation as a watershed event that provides
the evolution of U.S. space doctrine,
demonstrating the maturation of space
development. PLA space analysts noted
characteristics of American space operations
that had not been seen before. One novel
concept was the utilization of space assets as
a deterrent measure. 45 A second novel
concept was the implementation of weapons
that are “non-lethal and whose effects are
reversible.” 46 Since this initial space exercise,
the United States has conducted seven more;
the most recent was held in 2012 and focused
on the organizational system of Air Force
Space Command and integration of space
operations with ground operations and NATO
countries. 47 China is aware of the United
States investigation of space operational
theory and organization based studies,
indicating that the space domain is in the final
stages of maturation
DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM
APPLIED TO THE SPACE DOMAIN
After reviewing the general concept of
dialectical materialism and offering a macro
view of space history from the Chinese
perspective, the next important step to
understanding the foundation of Chinese
military space strategy is to synthesize
dialectical materialism with the historical
evolution of the space domain. Before
continuing with this synthesis, the Chinese
explicitly state that the goal of studying space
is to “understand its innate laws and
interrelationships.” 48 Only through this
understanding can the initiative in space be
obtained.

45

Ibid., 291.
Ibid., 292.
47
Jiang Lianju, ed., Lectures on the Science of Space
Operations (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013), 12.
46

One of the integral interrelationships is how
the Information Age and the space domain
relate and influence one another: “Progress in
science and technology has forcefully pushed
the development of mankind’s history
forward…transforming from the postIndustrial Age to the Information Age.” 49 The
new Age of Information has and will continue
to redefine economic and cultural patterns.
Instead of a world that values industrial
strength and manufacturing capability, the
Information Age will value comprehensive
knowledge.
As with many contradictions, the current
contradiction between the remnants of
industrialization and future of
informationization are a source of disruption.
The Information Age has already begun to
drastically affect “nations’ economic growth,
social development and national strength.” 50
The new competition enabled by the
Information Age is responsible for shifting
the world towards multipolarity and
“smashing the old proportion of strengths.” 51
Therefore, the Chinese are committed to using
the trend of informationization to strengthen
their cultural, economic, and international
standing and to shortcut the process of
catching up to the United States.
The revolution from an industrial world to an
informationized world touches upon every
aspect of society, including warfare. China
has concluded that warfare in the Age of
Information will be significantly different.
The goal of “warfare is no longer primarily to
annihilate the enemy’s effective strengths, but
rather it is primarily to destroy and paralyze
the enemy’s battlefield knowledge and
information systems, to effectively control his
48
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49
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50
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information flow, energy flows, and material
flows, thus achieving the goal of controlling
the battlefield.” 52 The objective in future
warfare will center on information
superiority. The driving force behind these
new laws of information warfare is the same
technological force that brought about the
information revolution. While the move
towards the Age of Information is relatively
new, it is not surprising because technology
has been moving civilization forward
throughout human history. In this regard, the
Age of Information and importance of the
space domain are the logical follow-ons of the
evolution of the land, sea, and air domains.
One of the main conclusions is that the space
domain holds the key to controlling the land,
sea, and air domains as well as dominance in
informationized warfare. The history of space
and how it was employed by the United States
and Soviet Union during the Cold War has led
the Chinese to reach this conclusion: “In the
21st century, possessing the vantage point of
outer space will to a very large degree allow
control of the progress and conclusion of war,
and at the present time, this is rapidly
developing in the direction of final guidance
to victory in war.” 53 The unique capabilities
of the space domain are why space “is the
strategic vantage point of informationized
warfare” and will provide the information
superiority that is necessary to capturing the
digitized battlefield. 54 Space military
strengths offer the solution to the
contradiction between the Chinese and
American militaries and will lead to “the
overall elevation of a national military
system’s confrontational capabilities.” 55
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After describing the law of space’s role in
information dominance, Chinese analysts
derive another important insight from the
history of the space domain, concluding that
space warfare is inevitable. Perhaps due to the
probabilistic nature of dialectic analysis, the
CPC tends to view the history of warfare
through a technological deterministic lens.
Although the CPC does not believe that
private property will cease to exist and is by
no means dedicated to ending private property
within China, the Party attributes the
accruement of wealth as the origin of war,
stating that the emergence of private property
led to warfare. 56 Furthermore, warfare is
rooted in the economy and “is the product of
certain economic relations among the state,
classes, and political groups.” 57 Once warfare
became a common behavior, science and
technology acted as the major impetus for the
development of war; as science and
technology have progressed, warfare has
become increasingly intense. 58 Just as
progress in technology on land, sea, and air
contributed to military confrontation,
technological progress in space will result in
space warfare: “By looking back through the
history of the development of human warfare,
we come to find that studies people have
carried out of the theory of operational
dominance began with land dominance, went
through sea dominance, air dominance, and
information dominance, and developed to
today’s space dominance. This has all come
about as mankind has continually expanded
his endeavors in various domains.” 59
In addition to the technological perspective,
Jia Jun Ming introduces Marxist commentary
56
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on the human component by stating, “What is
regrettable is that mankind is still unable to
part company with warfare at this point, and
mankind is destined to face the test of warfare
and in particular of space operations.” 60
Historical forces have led to the dawn of
space warfare, which will only continue to
intensify and define the 21st century: “the
trend toward the militarization of space
cannot be reversed.” 61
After the dialectical materialist framework led
to the belief that space warfare is necessary to
securing information dominance and is an
inescapable reality, the CPC shifted its focus
to the laws of space operations. The
individual laws, or conclusions, are numerous
and broad in nature. Nevertheless, Li
Daguang summarizes “The Basic Laws of
Contending for Space Dominance,” set the
context upon which more specific laws of
space operations can be developed and
understood. The author’s first law invokes a
Clausewitzian view of war: “contending for
space dominance must serve a country’s
political and security interests and
requirements.” 62 Similarly to other domains
of warfare, space is the “continuation of
politiks by other means.”

principle of limits by seeking to prevent
inadequate resource allocation to space
military strengths, cautioning against an
approach to space policy that is too limited. 66
The last general law that Daguang recognizes
is in regard to the international environment.
The author notes that the current space
environment is highly regulated by
international treaties and laws, which forces
the developers of space strategy to operate in
a constrained manner at the current time. 67
Nevertheless, the Chinese see these
constraints as limiting the United States,
giving China the opportunity to close the
space technology gap.
More specific laws of space operations are
developed within scope of the basic laws that
describe the state and future of the cosmic
space environment. Operational laws cover
subjects ranging from space forces
organizational theory, personnel development,
and space deterrence to manned offensive
operations during a conflict in space. The
nature of these laws rests in the application of
the elucidated guiding principles, applying
these principles in a strategic and tactical
manner to achieve space and information
dominance.

Next, Daguang asserts that as “powerful
support of a nation’s overall actual strength,”
space dominance must be one of the primary
national objectives to be realized. 63 In
contrast to the second law, Daguang’s third
law implores policymakers to adhere to the
principles of “Limits and Appropriateness.” 64
The principle of limits calls for space military
strengths to be used efficiently and practically
in an effort to protect against an economic
collapse akin to the Soviet Union’s. 65 The
principle of appropriateness clarifies the

Chinese space analysts consider a
comprehensive range of potential space
strategies and tactics. According to Jiang
Lianju, space operations are “military
confrontational activities that two hostile
sides engage in primarily in space. Their
essence is that they are a series of operational
actions where two hostile sides use their space
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strengths as their main operational strengths
and space as their main battlefield in order to
seize, hold, and use command of
space…They play an irreplaceable and unique
role in gaining victory in warfare.” 68 Due to
its broad scope, space operations include
space deterrence theory, space defensive and
offensive strategies, organizational evolution,
and guidance on how to operate within the
international environment.
While each of these areas has their own
separate characteristics and strategies, they
are all united by the universal characteristics
of the space domain. All operations in space
will occur in the vast expanse of space, where
confrontation will be intense. However, space
warfare will also manifest itself on ground
based targets. 69 The main reason for the
proliferation of conflict from the space
domain to the other domains lies in the nature
of informationized conflict, and “the two
hostile sides will inevitably mobilize all
means to cut off information links between
the opponent’s space and other battlefield
space.” 70 Operational actions will be rapid,
precise, and highly effective. It is necessary to
achieve rapidity, precision, and efficacy
because space operations and deployment will
be highly dispersed, while weapons and space
technology will be highly concentrated. 71
Additionally, space operations are less likely
to occur over a longer time period because
space support missions “are arduous.” 72

operations if necessary. 73 The primary focus
is to gain awareness in order to secure
China’s own space assets: “Space operations
overall are defensive, but in specifics, space
operations actions are not confined to
defense; instead, active space offensive
actions are adopted during the process of
defense.” 74 The Chinese develop their space
strategy based on the concepts of active
defense, full spectrum integration, and
focusing on controlling space. More
specifically, active defense can be thought of
“as a shield of clever attacks…it is defense
whose goals are passive but whose means are
active.” 75 Active defense is the foundational
concept for space operations, and fullspectrum integration describes the mechanism
and organizational form of space operations.
If achieved, active defense and full spectrum
integration will lead to the control of space. 76
Operationally, the PLA states that space
deterrence and actual warfare will be the two
main forms of space conflict in the 21st
century. 77 For the CPC, space deterrence
theory centers on influencing the opponent’s
psyche and operational tempo, preventing
them from launching an attack. The objective
of space deterrence is to both deter operations
in space as well as an overall war. Space
deterrence extends beyond the military sphere
and is a strategic political contest over the
international order. 78

The general framework and guidance for
space operations loosely adhere to
establishing awareness, carrying out defensive
operations, and engaging in offensive

Chinese analysts consider many different
levels of space deterrence. The lowest
intensity option is to simply develop space
strengths in a manner that results in your
opponent concluding that victory is
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impossible, preventing conflict before it
begins. The next level includes
demonstrations of space strength, such as the
anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test in 2007, and
space military exercises, which are combat
like space deterrent activities. 79 Space
military exercises signify a shift from low
intensity deterrence operations to more
confrontational deterrence operations. The
last nonviolent deterrence phase is preparing
space forces for deployment. 80 If none of the
nonviolent deterrence theories are effective,
then overawing, punitive space strikes will be
used. 81
The Chinese are clear that punitive strikes
should only be used as a last resort and when
“other means of space deterrence are
ineffective.” 82 The specifics of the punitive
strike can vary in nature from soft kill
information attack, such as space blockades,
to hard kill kinetic attacks. Regardless of
which specific deterrence level is used,
deterrence actions must be unified and
integrated, and cautious decision making is
necessary to prevent deterioration into
warfare. 83 Space deterrence seeks to
intimidate the enemy and prevent warfare, but
it is imperative that space forces are prepared
to rapidly shift from deterrent to warfare
operations.
The main objective of space defensive
operations is to protect China’s space assets
and capabilities. Their defensive posture calls
for passive defense techniques with the ability
to rapidly attack and counter attack if
necessary to protect themselves. One of the
foundational defensive tactics is the
camouflaging of satellites and space assets.
79
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80
Ibid., 157.
81
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82
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83
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The PLA seeks to use camouflage in order to
deceive the hostile aggressor. For example, a
satellite with military capability can be
designed to appear and function as if it were a
commercial spacecraft. Other deception
strategies include blending space satellites
with the outer space environment and using
virtual reality to create fake targets for the
enemy. 84 Stealth technology can be used to
deceive the enemy by applying absorptive
materials, eliminating reflective surfaces, and
including surfaces that refract energy. 85
Satellites and other spacecraft should also be
dispersed into a constellation pattern. The
miniaturization of space technology will make
this principle more feasible in the future. By
dispersing “hundreds” of micro-satellites, the
Chinese endeavor to eliminate any single
nodes of failure, allowing for functionality to
be unimpaired if one part of the constellation
is eliminated. 86 Spacecraft should also be able
to execute orbital maneuvers, avoiding a
direct threat. 87
However, if the above strategies fail, then the
Chinese plan on developing counter attack
capability to preserve their space operational
strengths. In a counter-attack, offensive space
weapons would be used to eliminate hostile
targets that are posing a direct threat. 88
Importantly, counter attacks must be on the
same operational scale as the threat. 89
While all of the above defensive strategies
addressed assets in the space environment,
joint ground protection is also necessary to
ensure the survival of space assets. Ground
control stations, launch sites, and support
facilities are just as vital to the space
84
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operation. Similar to constellations of
satellites, the PLA reasons that ground bases
should be deployed over a broad area. 90 If
possible, ground assets should be concealed
and mobile, preventing the enemy from
obtaining the requisite information to carry
out a strike. 91
The air force, navy, and army will form a
joint defensive system. ICBMs pose one of
the most significant threats to space assets,
which is why the Chinese are committed to
developing a National Missile Defense system
and Theater Missile Defense system similar to
America’s. 92 The Chinese vision of defensive
space operations and strengths is integrated in
nature, combining strategy and technology at
multiple levels to ensure the survival of their
space capability and, therefore, their national
security.
Space offensive strengths are second to space
defensive strengths in Chinese space strategy.
This corresponds to their overall operational
framework of active defense. Another reason
is that Chinese analysts predict that during the
early 21st century the focus will be on
“developing space information weapons and
equipment…comprehensively raising China’s
military space information assistance and
support capabilities…offensive operations in
space will appear, [but] their scale and
intensity will be quite limited.” 93
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these offensive tactics focus on disrupting
satellites through hard kill or soft kill
weapons. Hard kill weapons use kinetic
energy based weapons and direct energy
weapons (high powered electromagnetic
weapons) to permanently destroy or impair an
enemy spacecraft. 95 On the other hand, soft
kill weapons, such as low powered lasers and
electromagnetic pulses, are designed to
incapacitate an enemy spacecraft. 96
Also, the Chinese consider many more
potential offensive weapons: orbital bombing
from space to Earth, manned spaceflight
missions for military purposes, the use of
space stations as military bases, earth to space
weapons (ASATs/lasers), and high altitude
weapons that can target ground and space
assets simultaneously. However, these are
considered potential avenues for
development, and the authors remain
noncommittal when discussing them.
Lastly, the Chinese acknowledge that
unmanned operations will play a significant
role in all space operations, including
offensive operations. Because a human may
not be able to process the “integrated and
highly coordinated operational actions in
multidimensional surface, aerial and space
environments…occasions will occur where
there will be unmanned combat or where
robots will face one another.” 97

Nevertheless, China considers a broad range
of space offensive strategies. The objectives
of space offensive strengths are to “annihilate
enemy space satellites in an effective manner
and suppress enemy satellite launches while
ensuring that their own satellites avoid
[attack] or minimally suffer attack.” 94 Most of

Just as technology, theory, and tactics are
evolving, the organizational layout of the
PLA must evolve as well. If organization
remains stagnant, then China will be unable to
seize space dominance. Currently, the PLA
system sees itself as a “tree structure,” but the
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future organization of China’s military must
be a “network type of scale.” 98
This metaphor accurately summarizes the
CPC’s beliefs about organizational change.
The command and organizational structure
have been built in a traditional and linear style
and will be inadequate to meet the demands
of information warfare. Instead, a network
style of command must be set up. This style
would allow for faster communication
between the Central Military Commission and
operational forces. While centralization is
important to maintain cohesion,
decentralization must also be embraced,
allowing individual units to respond rapidly
and with precision. China hopes to resolve the
contradiction between centralization and
decentralization by establishing this network
style of command structure.
The development of space deterrence,
defensive operational strengths, and offensive
operational strengths must occur within the
current international context. China
understands that the international community
is a restraining factor to the complete
maturation of space warfare: “There are an
ever-greater number of international factors
restraining military actions in outer space, and
these have a comprehensive effect on space
operations.” 99

of course, international law could hinder
China’s ability to fully informationize their
forces. This contradiction would lead China to
adopt different strategies based on “China’s
newfound position of parity or even
superiority over the enemy.” 101 As China’s
space power grows, they will have the
opportunity to directly affect international law
and try to craft an international law system
that is more conducive to their goals: “The
contradiction between international law and
the militarization of space is not immutable;
at some point it may be resolved, and some
other contradiction [may] take its place.” 102
THE REALIST CRITIQUE
Although the source material is
inundated with dialectical materialism, in
terms of philosophy and diction, the
possibility remains that China’s space strategy
and perspective could be driven by balance of
power politics. On the surface level, this is a
logical argument. Many of the People’s
Republic of China’s recent moves to
strengthen their international standing fit
nicely with the realist lens. The overlap
between balance of power and dialectical
materialism is a result of their mutual reliance
on contradictions. The nature of power
politics is founded in the contradictions that
arise from unequal power in the international
realm.

However, China realizes that they have
benefited from international laws limiting
space operations. For example, when China
has weaker space technology relative to their
competitor, the guidance is to oppose space
weaponization, adhere to the law, and apply
“selective measures in peacetime that
complicate or restrict the powerful enemy’s
ability to weaponize space.” 100 In the future,

In fact, relatively recent changes in the PRC’s
military structure were driven by power
politics and contradictions. In 2015, President
Xi Jingping detailed a set of military reforms
that significantly altered the organization of
the PLA. 103 Essentially, three “new services”
were incorporated into the PLA: Ground
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Forces Command, PLA Rocket Force, and
Strategic Support Force. The Strategic
Support Force has been tasked with focusing
on cyber and space warfare, a clear attempt
for China to modernize these capabilities and
increase its standing on the international
stage. The PLA Rocket Force, historically
known as the Second Artillery, will be
responsible for “China’s conventional and
nuclear ballistic missiles.” 104 China’s
elevation of the Second Artillery to its own
service has its foundation in the Taiwan Strait
Crisis of 1996. During the Crisis, China
realized that although they had around 200
short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)
deployed across from Taiwan, their accuracy
prevented any meaningful targeting of
military, transportation, or command and
control targets. 105 Since then, Beijing has
invested in the modernization of their ballistic
missile arsenal, attempting to rebalance power
in the region and attain the advantage.
The security dilemma, an application of
realism and a core contradiction, could also
be having an impact on Chinese space
doctrine. The PRC believes that the United
States is committed to seizing the space
domain and exerting dominance over it.
President Kennedy’s quotation from the
1960s summarizes how the Chinese
understand American intentions in the space
domain. President Kennedy stated, “seizing
space supremacy is the main content of the
next 10 years. Whoever controls space will
control the Earth.” 106 China is not planning
for a general war against the United States,
but they are developing their theory and
capability of active defense to defend their
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104
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security interests against U.S.
encroachment. 107
The security dilemma can be viewed as
another manifestation of the balance of
power. Because China is concerned that the
United States may encroach on their national
interests in the space domain, they
aggressively develop their active defense
capability. In turn, the United States responds
to China by further developing space
capability.
The realist lens seems promising on its
surface, but it can only provide an incomplete
answer. Realist analysis applies the rational
actor model to international players, which is
not a safe assumption in geopolitics and
international relations. Dialectical materialism
offers a deeper “why” than the realist
perspective can provide. The nature of the
dialectic results in laws that are “deterministic
and probabilistic” in some form, which are
supplemental to realist philosophy. 108
Although the PRC certainly includes
objective and subjective factors when
discussing operational success, there has been
a recent shift toward technological
determinism under President Xi Jingping’s
national innovation initiative. 109 As a result,
elucidation of laws of the space domain and
space operational theory has a tendency to be
deterministic. These laws then offer
conclusions that overlap but do not replicate
the realist perspective. The answers do not lie
wholly on one side. Both realism and
dialectical materialism affect Chinese space
doctrine.
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Determining the degree to which the dialectic
actually impacts China’s space strategy can
be tricky. On a general level, dialectical
materialist thought shapes how China sees the
history and future of space strategy; this is
illustrated by their belief that space will play a
significant role in the chaotic revolution
leading to the Age of Information. The
potential of space capability to aid in
resolving contradictions within China and in
the international domain is also an expression
of dialectical thinking. The methodology that
Chinese military analysts use is dialectical
materialist in nature, as they consistently
attempt to identify the laws that govern space
capability and space operations theory.
On the other hand, some experts outside of
China posit that the CPC references
dialectical materialist thought to silence its
critics. In 2013 and 2015, President Xi held a
“Politburo study session to underscore his
commitment to Marxism and socialism.” 110
President Xi has been more consistent in
valuing dialectical materialism than his
predecessor and claims that the goal of these
study sessions is to “help leaders understand
Marxist philosophy in even more depth.” 111
Nevertheless, Zhang Ming, a political
scientist at Renmin University, summarizes
the skeptical view, “It’s a political declaration
that party leaders have to do from time to
time.” 112 Dialectical materialism certainly
provides context in which to view macro
global patterns, but the next question is, does
it have an effect on specific policy?
The concept of asymmetry and asymmetric
warfare further complicates finding an
110
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answer. Based on the contradiction between
Chinese and American military capabilities,
PLA and CPC thinkers understand that in
order to be competitive in a potential conflict
with the United States, they will have to target
specific American vulnerabilities in order to
level the playing field. Space military
technology is an enabling force in balancing
military technology.
A 2015 RAND report studied the “trajectory
of Chinese capability from 1996” and sought
to predict what their capability will be in
2017. 113 The study focused on counterspace
technology, and two important takeaways
were that China has rapidly modernized its
space force, and although China’s space
capabilities are not equal to America’s, they
have the capability to pose “significant
challenges to U.S. operations.” 114 RAND
measured Chinese counterspace ability in two
contexts: a Taiwan scenario and a Spratly
Islands scenario. In both scenarios, RAND
projected that Chinese counterspace
capability would have “equal parity” when
compared to U.S. space capability. 115 China’s
focus on counterspace technology could be
interpreted as a manifestation of asymmetric
warfare, driven by the contradiction between
Sino and American military capability.
One area where dialectical materialism
provides insight is on which space and
counterspace technologies China pursues.
Although “it is not yet clear whether the PLA
has promulgated a formal doctrine for
military space operations,” they have
aggressively focused on developing certain
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capabilities. 116 According to Dean Cheng’s
analysis, China has focused on developing the
following space capabilities: ability to enter
space, ability to exploit space, ability to
control space, anti-satellite weapons, cyber
weapons, directed energy weapons, rapid
space launch capability, and better space
situational awareness. 117
In addition, the CCP is committed to
developing a manned space flight program. 118
The motivations of China’s manned space
program extend beyond the realist and
asymmetric warfare rationale. From the realist
point of view and asymmetric warfare
perspectives, manned space programs
contribute to national prestige and do provide
limited military usefulness. However, the
overarching goals of the programs are “to
utilize outer space for peaceful purposes,
promote mankind’s civilization and social
progress, and benefit the whole of mankind;
and to meet the growing demands of
economic construction, national security,
science and technology development and
social progress, protect China’s national
interests and build up the comprehensive
national strength.” 119
These goals of the manned space program
readily fit into the dialectical materialist
perspective. In comparison to other military
space technology, manned flight is
significantly more expensive and time
consuming to develop, so an asymmetrical or
realist rationale does not adequately explain
why China is so committed to their manned
spaceflight program. Referring back to Li
Daguang’s Principles of Limits and
Appropriateness provides insight into why
China is pursuing this capability. Because
116
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manned space flight satisfies dialectical
materialist thinking about the future role and
potential of space, it is appropriate that China
develops this capability alongside its other
military space capability.
The precise degree to which military analysts
and the CPC use dialectical materialism to
make strategic and tactical decisions is, even
among China watchers, probably
unknowable. In essence, the contradictions
among dialectical materialism, realism, and
asymmetrical warfare are manifested in this
essay. One of the great obstacles to resolving
these contradictions analytically is the lack of
formalized military space doctrine, which is
still under development by the PLA. Perhaps
the only clear answer is that Chinese space
strategy is significantly affected by realist
tendencies, asymmetric warfare, and
dialectical materialism.
U.S. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Moving forward, the United States
must strengthen its understanding of
dialectical materialism and how it factors into
the CPC’s decision making. After the end of
the Cold War, the Pivot to the Pacific
occurred at a lethargic pace due to exigent
events such as the Invasion of Iraq and
Afghanistan. As a result, widespread expertise
in Asia is lacking among policymakers,
Congress, and the Department of Defense.
Source material for this work demonstrates
that Chinese analysts follow a general pattern
of deduction when approaching a topic. Once
basic laws have been uncovered, assuming
that they do exist, then evolution in theory
follows. Because the dialectic is tied
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intimately with their decision making
processes, an improved understanding of it in
the context of the CPC would enable the
United States to better predict how the CPC
will react to American presence or operations
in the region and gain insight into the
formulations of the PRC’s strategy across all
domains.
From a military perspective, the United States
must focus on developing resilience in
military space capability. While PLA analysts
are vague on implications of the principle of
active defense, China could well decide to
attack U.S. space assets during a conflict. It is
possible that as China’s military space
capability grows, the probability of space
military operations becomes more likely.
In Phillip Saunders’ testimony before the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, he provided recommendations
that the U.S. military should adopt to make
American space assets less suitable targets for
attack. One key area is developing logistical
support to rapidly replace damaged or
destroyed satellites. However, this becomes
increasingly difficult as China’s ASAT
capabilities increase. 120 Miniaturization and
constellation dispersion of satellites would
reduce vulnerability and decrease the
consequences of the loss of one satellite. 121
The U.S. should also explore intermingling
space assets with other foreign governments,
which would increase the political risk of an
attack. 122

using space based weapons. 123 Lastly, the
United States military could also transfer
some of its intelligence and reconnaissance
systems to non-space tactical reconnaissance
systems, reducing the degree to which the
military relies on space. 124 The United States
military also has the obligation to modernize
informed battle management and command
and control (BMC2). In the Age of
Information, with “the growth in the volume
of information available and an anticipated
increase in duration and intensity of potential
future combat operations, the potential for
saturation of centralized decisionmakers using
this ISR requires a relook at tactical command
and control.” 125 Moving to a nodal approach
promises to establish more resilient BMC2
systems, reducing the burden on space
military assets. 126
CONCLUSION
The Communist Party of China is
committed to rapidly improving their space
operational strengths. Their reasoning and
motivation for focusing on space capabilities
is driven by their dialectical materialist
perspective on the development of warfare
and of the space domain.

From a more tactical perspective, the United
States must be able to effectively attack and
destroy Chinese ASAT systems, potentially

From the Chinese perspective, the evolution
of warfare in other domains suggests that
space warfare is inevitable: “From the history
of military development perspective, when
humankind marched form the land to the sea,
command of the sea was created. When
humans were able to ride in an aircraft to
leave the ground, command of the air was
created. Thus, when humans began to gain
mastery of the technology to enter space, this
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also created command of space.” 127 The
struggle in space will be more intense than
any previous conflict due to vast benefits of
controlling the space domain. The promise of
space dictates that “whoever controls space
controls the entire world. Space will become a
new domain in the future for the fierce
struggle between nations because space
affects the fundamental interests of
nations.” 128
The People’s Republic of China is focused on
the space domain because it seeks to alleviate
two main contradictions that the CPC must
address. The Age of Information and new
information revolution will rely on space as a
propulsive force. By enhancing their space
capability, the CPC believes they can improve
their economic standing, strengthen their
culture, and secure the survival of the Party.
In addition to this fundamental domestic
contradiction, space capabilities will help
ameliorate the contradiction between the
United States military technological
capability and China’s. The space domain is
the focus, because it can be developed
rapidly, leading to a quick shift in space
operational strengths.

PLA analysts again explore a range of
options.
Although a specific, tactical space strategy
has not been adopted, one necessary step to
successfully implement new space operational
theory is to evolve organizational layout to
achieve a balance between centralization and
decentralization for effectively engaging in
informationized conflict. As a result, the
United States should reduce vulnerability on
space assets while redefining our command
and control system to stay competitive
moving forward in the 21st century.
Although other lenses such as balance of
power politics and asymmetric warfare can
offer some justification for China’s space
strategy, dialectical materialism is integral to
understanding the logic and rationale behind
it. As Sun Tzu wrote, “If you know your
enemies and know yourself, you will not be
defeated in a hundred battles.” Understanding
the dialectical materialist perspective enables
us to know our competitor, adequately
preparing the United States for future
challenges in the space domain.

The PLA considers a variety of tactics to
incorporate into their space strategy. Their
overall framework for space operational
theory includes active defense and full
spectrum integration. China’s first objective
in space is to defend their space capability,
protecting their national security interests.
However, active defense includes offensive
operations that are deemed necessary to
protect space assets. China’s space theorists
identify space deterrence, space defense, and
space offense as the three main types of space
operational theories. Within each category,
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Communicating Cyber Consequences
Timothy Goines
More consideration ought to be accorded “loud” cyber weapons for signaling resolve in 21st century
deterrence contests.

“Deterrence is at times a necessary or
useful instrument of foreign policy, but the
correct and prudent use of deterrence strategy
is by no means self-evident or easily
determined in all circumstances.” 1
In their seminal text, Alexander L.
George and Richard Smoke thoroughly
examined the topic of deterrence, tracing its
historical roots and conducting case studies
on its use. 2 The product of this intense study
was a formula that encapsulates the essence of
deterrence theory. “In its simplest form,
deterrence is merely a contingent threat: ‘If
you do x, I shall do y to you.’ If the opponent
expects the costs of y to be greater than the
benefits of x, he will refrain from doing [x];
he is deterred.” 3 Since its pronouncement,
this formula has been codified in Department
of Defense (DoD) doctrine, most recently in
the DoD’s “Deterrence Ops Joint Operating
Concept” and it’s “Cyber Strategy.” 4
Unfortunately, in this simple form, the
formula is misleading. It tends to convince
the reader that deterrence is a simple
balancing act and all a deterring state must do
is increase the costs to outweigh the benefits.
This omits a fundamental aspect of
1

Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence
in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 3. Maj.
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2
See generally, George and Smoke, Deterrence in
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3
George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign
Policy, 48.

deterrence, the actor’s perception of the
anticipated costs and benefits. In other words,
it is not the actual costs and benefits that the
actor weighs within this formula, but the
anticipated costs and benefits. Therefore, if
an actor perceives the costs to be higher than
the actual costs, the deterring party benefits
from this miscalculation. Conversely, if an
actor perceives the costs to be lower than the
actual costs, it is to the deterring party’s
detriment, regardless of the actual costs.
A more accurate formulation is as follows: if
the anticipated costs of a proposed action
exceed the anticipated benefits of that action,
the actor is less likely to engage in the action
and is deterred. This revised formulation
flows naturally from the original. As George
and Smoke note, it is a contingent threat, and
if the opponent expects the costs to be greater,
then he is deterred. 5 Additionally, this
formulation, revised from DoD orthodoxy,
makes sense: the actor in practice is unable to
know precisely the costs and benefits prior to
his action; those occur after and in response to
the act.
Consequently, formulation of an effective
deterrence strategy should focus on increasing
4
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anticipated costs and decreasing anticipated
benefits. This article focuses on the former in
the cyber domain. Specifically, how should
the United States increase the anticipated
costs of cyber actions in order to effectively
deter adversaries?
The key to increasing anticipated costs in the
cyber domain is not novel or unique; nations
have effectively communicated and continue
to communicate consequences to their
adversaries within other domains (i.e. air,
land, and sea) through declaratory policies,
signaling, and response actions. Therefore,
the solution to increasing anticipated costs in
the mind of the adversary within the cyber
domain is a familiar one. But, perhaps the
most difficult aspect of communicating cyber
consequences is not the ways to increase
costs, but the selection of the appropriate
means to effectively communicate within the
cyber domain—one that possesses the
appropriate characteristics. This article
proposes a solution, which is, loud cyber
weapons.
Loud cyber weapons are cyber weapons that
can be definitively traced to the deterring
party. When using these new cyber weapons,
the “deterrer” does not obscure the operation
or its source from being discovered by the
victim and correctly attributed. Currently,
much of military cyber operations are kept
secret in an attempt to avoid detection by the
target nation and, if discovered, attribution.
Loud cyber weapons would turn this
paradigm on its head, exposing its means,
methods, and source to target nations and the
international community.
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part, this article highlights the lack of
communication within the cyber domain,
delineates the characteristics of effective
signaling and follow-through, discusses how
each is present in effective signaling
examples, and uses these characteristics to
evaluate the proposed solution—use of loud
cyber weapons.
DETERRENCE THEORY
FOUNDATIONS
Requirements
George and Smoke articulated three
requirements of deterrence: “(1) the full
formulation of one’s intent to protect a nation;
(2) the acquisition and deployment of
capacities to back up the intent; and (3) the
communication of the intent to the potential
‘aggressor.’” 6 Each of these three
requirements serve a critical purpose, giving
rise to particular attributes of an effective
deterrence strategy: a system of rules,
credibility, commitment, and communication.
A short discussion of these requirements and
attributes will assist in identifying
characteristics of effective communication,
which will be used to analyze the proposed
solution for the cyber domain.

This article first explores the foundations of
an effective deterrence strategy, evaluating
examples that demonstrate it in practice, and
affirming the importance of communication
for effective deterrence policy. In the second

The first requirement, the full formulation of
one’s intent to protect a nation, is distilled
into a system of rules. In this context, a
system of rules is a domestic policy wherein
the deterring state defines its thresholds for
certain adverse actions (considering specific
domestic targets and competing actors) and
corresponding responses. It is created by
considering a number of factors, including
“the decision to attempt deterrence in a given
case…the perception and analysis of the
threat…the U.S. national interests in the case,
and the determination of what kinds of
responses…” are appropriate. 7 The process
of fully forming intent serves two purposes

6

7
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for a deterring state. First, it organizes the
deterring state’s thoughts on unwanted
adverse actions into a practical, rule-based
approach. Secondly, it informs the deterring
state’s executive on what actions are to be
deterred and what institutional tools are
available for policy implementation.
Second, a deterrence strategy must include the
acquisition and deployment of capacities to
back up the intended response. This serves to
lend credibility to a deterrence strategy and to
demonstrate that a deterring state is
committed to enforce its system of rules.
Naturally, if the adversary is not convinced
that the deterring state has capability to
impose costs, the actor is unlikely to be
deterred. For example, if the deterring state
has a system of rules that requires a response
when an adversary enters its territorial waters,
yet it lacks adequate Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) or
naval assets, then deterrence, when tested, is
likely to fail.
Finally, an effective deterrence strategy must
communicate intent to the potential aggressor.
While the first two requirements of deterrence
are critically important (and the emphasis of
George and Smoke’s extensive study), the
focus of this paper is on this third
requirement—communicating potential
consequences to the adversary. If an actor
does not know about potential costs, the actor
cannot justify changing its behavior. Within
this requirement, other attributes of deterrence
strategy are empowered. For example, in
order for a system of rules to be effective,
they must be communicated to inform the
adversary. Likewise, the credibility of a
deterring state’s intent is only effective if its
capabilities are understood by the adversary,
8
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convincing a challenger that cost imposition
by the defense is possible. Lastly, a nation
must communicate its commitment to a
deterrence strategy, convincing the target
actor that political will for cost imposition is
likely.
Oftentimes, communication of a deterrence
strategy is accomplished in three ways,
typically employed sequentially: declaratory
policy, signaling, and follow-through. First, a
deterring state should make their system of
rules public through declaratory policy. This
communicates to adversaries which actions
and targets will produce a negative response
and the likely magnitude of this response.
Historically, with respect to nuclear
deterrence, the United States declared that any
launch of a nuclear weapon would result in a
retaliatory strike.
In the event declaratory policy itself does not
deter and a malicious act is anticipated, a
deterring state may seek to further
communicate their credibility and
commitment through the use of signaling.
Signaling by a deterring state demonstrates
intent to enforce its system of rules. 8 For
example, if a country has a system of rules
that declares an invasion will be met with
significant force, this state may demonstrate
its credibility and commitment by amassing
troops along the border. It should be noted
that signaling can take many forms, from a
traditional “show of force” to less direct
methods, like conducting a public test on a
new weapons system. 9
Finally, if deterrence is still not successful
after signaling, a state may actually impose
the corresponding costs in response to the
malicious act; in other words, it may followthrough on the threatened costs by imposing
9
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them. This further reinforces the state’s
credibility and commitment to its system of
rules. While it may not serve the deterrent
function for the initial challenge, it does serve
as a deterrent for future malicious acts. For
example, if another state probes a deterring
state (despite the various warnings), the state
may respond with considerable force in order
to communicate their capabilities and
commitment against future invasions.
The bottom line is that these forms of
communication are critical to the success of a
deterrence strategy because they apprise an
adversary of potential costs, increasing their
estimation of the anticipated costs. A crucial
component of any deterrence strategy is to
ensure the communications piece is addressed
and employed.
Case Studies of Deterrence in Practice
States routinely employ this
methodology when attempting to deter other
states from engaging in certain conduct. The
following is a brief discussion of four relevant
examples where the deterring state used
tactics in an effort to communicate its system
of rules, credibility, and commitment to
adversaries. In some cases, their efforts were
effective; in others, a missing component
undermined their larger deterrence policy.
1. U.S. Deterrence of a Soviet Union
Nuclear Strike
Perhaps the best example of where a deterring
state made repeated efforts to communicate
the potential costs of a particular action is the
United States attempt to deter the Soviet
Union from engaging in nuclear warfare
throughout the Cold War. Notably, the
United States successfully employed the three
requirements for an effective deterrence
strategy. First, through the trials of the Cold
10
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War and its aftermath, the United States fully
formed its intent to protect itself and its allies
against potential nuclear strikes and, in the
event of a nuclear attack, to respond with a
retaliatory strike. Second, the United States
developed, and still maintains, the acquisition
and deployment capacities to back up the
intent.
Most importantly, though, the United States
communicated this policy, and used signaling
to convince potential adversaries that it was
committed to the policy and that the threat
was credible. Over the course of the Cold
War, the United States threatened the Soviet
Union that any nuclear launch would lead to a
“massive retaliation” whereby the United
States would destroy the full range of value
targets in the Soviet Union. 10 When the
declaratory policy alone did not appear to be
deterring the Soviet Union, the United States
then demonstrated its credibility and
commitment to this threat through signaling.
In this instance, signaling was not amassing
troops along a border, but rather, the
development, testing, and deployment of
nuclear weapons across the nuclear triad. For
example, the United States conducted 1,024
tests of their nuclear weapons from 1945–
1992, more than any other country. 11 This
testing sent a strong message to the Soviet
Union that the United States had both the
commitment and credibility necessary to
enforce its policy. As a result, the Soviet
Union could better estimate the potential costs
and factor them into its decision calculus.
2. U.S. Deterrence of North Korea
A more contemporary example can be found
in recent events between the United States
and North Korea. Since its establishment in
the 1950s, North Korea’s nuclear
11
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development program has been the subject of
intense scrutiny from the United States and
the international community. 12 With varying
degrees of success, many diplomatic efforts
have been attempted throughout the years to
stop the program and halt the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. 13 Upon the election of
President Donald Trump, the U.S. approach to
North Korea became a more aggressive
deterrence approach—the United States
sought to deter North Korea from developing
and testing nuclear weapons through more
aggressive rhetoric and signaling.
For example, after North Korea launched its
twentieth ballistic missile in 2017 and tested
what many believed to be a thermonuclear
device, President Trump announced that he
was stationing three carrier strike groups in
the area of operations in close proximity to
North Korea. 14 A single carrier strike group
is typically comprised of an aircraft carrier,
which can hold up to sixty aircraft (including
F/A-18 strike fighters), along with destroyers
and cruisers, both of which are equipped with
the Aegis anti-ballistic missile system and
Tomahawk cruise missiles. 15 They can also
be accompanied by attack submarines, but
their locations remain secret. 16 While
stationed near North Korea, the three carrier
strike groups conducted a joint exercise, with
participation from South Korean and Japanese
warships. 17

of the three requirements were met. First, as
mentioned above, the United States during the
Cold War fully formed its nuclear weapons
policy—making a clear statement that the use
of nuclear weapons is not tolerated.
However, in recent years, the United States
has gone even further, focusing not only on
the use of nuclear weapons, but also their
development and testing. For example, the
United States ratified the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in
1968 in an effort to reduce the spread of
nuclear weapons technology. 18 More
recently, after the Cold War, the United States
signed two Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties
(START and New START) to reduce the
superpower stockpiles of nuclear weapons. 19
The two efforts make clear that the United
States wants to limit the number of nuclear
weapons and the number of nations with
nuclear weapons capabilities. For example,
when reports surfaced that Iran was violating
its commitment to the NPT and developing its
nuclear program, the United States attempted
to thwart it, eventually reaching a (temporary)
deal with Iran to stop their nuclear weapons
development. 20 Given these measures, the
United States has fully formed its desire to
stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

As with the first example, the United States
followed the expected pattern, ensuring each

Second, to back up its intent, the United
States indicated that it will use either the
threat of nuclear strike or conventional
weapons to prevent the proliferation of
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nuclear weapons. In either case, the United
States has the acquisition and deployment
capacities to use either option, lending
credibility to the potential costs.
Finally, the United States communicated this
policy and, more recently, employed signaling
to demonstrate its resolve. For example, the
United States communicated this policy
directly to North Korea and its closest ally,
China. First, the United States made clear
through press releases and otherwise that it
would not tolerate North Korea’s continued
development of nuclear weapons. 21 Through
the course of this administration and the
previous one, there is no question on the U.S.
stance.
Unfortunately, this policy alone did not deter
North Korea from further developing its
nuclear weapons program. As a result,
President Trump took the next step in the
deterrence communication process and
signaled U.S. commitment and capability by
stationing the three carrier strike groups in the
area of operations. This sent a powerful
message. By stationing these groups near
North Korea, which have the capacity to
shoot down ballistic missiles with the onboard
Aegis system, the U.S. communicated both
the credibility of its intent and the
commitment to follow through. This
communication allowed North Korea to
conduct a more accurate assessment of the
potential costs of their nuclear weapons
development.
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turn, the United States softened their
deterrence efforts towards North Korea.
Whether this commitment will be successful
is yet to be seen; however, the use of
deterrence to get North Korea to negotiate
with the United States was rather successful.
3. China’s Deterrence of Space-Based
Operations
In 2018, China conducted another AntiSatellite weapon (ASAT) test under the guise
of a missile defense interceptor trial. 23 In the
test, China used the DN-3 anti-satellite
interceptor, which is capable of being
launched from land, directly ascending, and
striking a satellite orbiting Earth. 24 For the
United States, which relies heavily on
satellites for communication, location data,
and intelligence, the message was loud and
clear: China has the commitment and
credibility to engage in space warfare and
disable space-based operations. However,
when considering what larger deterrence
message China was attempting to send, the
message is more ambiguous.

Fortunately, a follow-through was not
required as North Korea made a commitment
to halt their nuclear weapons program. 22 In

China has likely fully formed its intent to
protect their nation, and the ASAT test (and
the many before it) demonstrates that China
possesses the acquisition and deployment of
capacities to back up the intent. But, as far as
the communication requirement, China failed
in the first step—to communicate a
declaratory policy or system of rules. As a
result, what are the United States and other
similarly situated nations supposed to take
from this ASAT test and its predecessors?
Without a clear system of rules, the target
states are left with little information to predict
future behavior and calculate potential costs.
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So, while China’s ability to wage space war is
undisputed, the larger deterrence message is
lost on potential adversaries.
With that said, there can be some strategic
benefits to ambiguity (e.g., How will China
use ASAT capabilities in the future? What
could trigger an ASAT response? What action
is China trying to deter?). This ambiguity
could serve China well, given the United
States and other countries’ reliance on space
assets and their significant vulnerabilities.
Ambiguity could cause doubt in the mind of
adversaries, fearing that certain actions may
result in certain conduct. Even so, this level
of decision-making paralysis is unlikely.
What is more likely is that, given a lack of
clear rules, adversaries will use this ambiguity
as justification to “poke and prod” China to
determine what they can do and what
provokes a response.
What is clear is that China’s ASAT test did
communicate something, but the scope of its
deterrent effect is less certain. This
emphasizes the importance of each step of an
effective deterrence strategy, including the
need to communicate the system of rules.
4. U.S. Deterrence of China’s Claim to the
South China Sea
In August of 2017, the U.S.S. John S.
McCain, a U.S. Navy destroyer, traveled
close to Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands,
an area over which China has territorial
disputes with its neighbors, including Brunei,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and
Vietnam. 25 The United States has long
criticized China’s construction of islands,
used for military purposes, throughout the
South China Sea and has asked for more
25
Idrees Ali, “U.S. destroyer challenges China's claims
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26
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27
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international participation regarding the
area. 26 There is little doubt that this
maneuver was meant to send a message
regarding the U.S. position. In fact, this was
the third mission of this kind (a freedom of
navigation operation [FONOP]) during the
Trump presidency, with the administration
vowing to conduct more operations in the
area. 27
While it may seem at first glance that this was
not a deterrence operation, it was. The United
States was attempting to deter China from
continuing to claim the South China Sea as its
territory. This particular scenario follows the
expected pattern. First, the United States
declared its dissatisfaction for the tactic used
by China to expand its territorial waters,
especially over a highly traversed area in the
South China Sea, and repeatedly warned that
it will not recognize the area as China’s
territory. Second, the United States
demonstrated the acquisition and deployment
capacities to be able to back up its intent that
this area remain international waters; namely,
by traversing it with naval sea craft.
Finally, the United States communicated its
stance on the South China Sea to China and
the international community on several
occasions, demanding that China stop
claiming land within the area. 28 The United
States attempted diplomatic efforts to stop
China’s militarization. For example,
President Obama urged a peaceful resolution
in May 2016. 29 The United Nations found
that China had no legal basis to claim historic
rights for the bulk of the South China Sea
(which the United States supported). 30
Unfortunately, such efforts were
unsuccessful. Thus, the United States moved
28
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29
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30
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to the next step in the process—signaling—by
sending the U.S.S. John S. McCain into the
area.
It is important to note that the United States
used a U.S. Navy Destroyer to conduct this
FONOP. Instead of using commercial sea
craft, which might communicate a desire to
have freedom of navigation, the United States
used a U.S. Navy ship, essentially informing
China that the United States desires to have
freedom of navigation in this area and will
ensure this by force, if necessary. So, when
the U.S.S. John S. McCain was approached
by two Chinese warships, the destroyer had
the necessary weapons to respond, if
provoked.
While resolution of China’s claims over the
South China Sea is yet to be determined, this
operation is a good example of deterrence
strategy in action. The operation was the
latest in a series meant to signal U.S.
displeasure with China’s policy and a
willingness to engage, if necessary. As the
United States continues its stance on China’s
policy, the recent series of FONOPs leave
little doubt over U.S. resolve, commitment,
and credibility.
THE CYBER DOMAIN AND
DETERRENCE
Given the number of nations with
cyber capabilities, the cyber domain has
become a viable space to employ deterrence
actions. Although it is a different domain
analytically, the requirements of an effective
deterrence strategy remain the same and the
need to communicate the potential
consequences remains paramount. The
second part of this article explores how to
best communicate a state’s deterrence policy
within the cyber domain. This begins with
recognition of a fundamental problem with
the current employment of cyber actions.
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Then, it evaluates requirements of a signal
and follow-through sequence, discussing how
these can be found in examples of deterrence
in practice. Finally, it applies these
requirements to the proposed solution—loud
cyber weapons.
At the outset, it should be noted that this
article focuses on how best to employ actions
within the cyber domain for the purpose of
deterrence, whether those actions deter an
adversary in the cyber domain or in other
domains (i.e., land, sea, air, or space). In
other words, deterrence actions can have an
intra-domain effect and a cross-domain effect.
This article does not attempt to distinguish
between the two, as most traditional
deterrence actions have similar potential
effects. Rather, this article focuses on how to
employ actions within the cyber domain to
deter adversaries both inside and outside of
the cyber domain.
A Fundamental Problem with Current Cyber
Employment
Previous examples serve to
demonstrate the importance of
communicating a deterrence strategy through
declaratory statements, signaling, and followthrough; communication allows the adversary
to understand the system of rules,
commitment, and credibility and better
calculate the potential costs. Unfortunately,
communication within the cyber domain has
proven elusive. Herein lies a fundamental
problem with the current cyber employment.
In short, cyber capable nations employ
virtually no tactics in the cyber domain in an
effort to communicate potential costs, the
credibility of potential cost imposition, or its
commitment to imposing these costs. There
are various reasons for this.
One significant contributing factor is that
nearly all cyber operations are classified as
“Top Secret.” For example, the Presidential
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Policy Directive that used to govern U.S.
cyber operations policy (PPD 20) itself was
classified as Top Secret. It was recently
replaced by President Trump, but the new
order is also classified. 31 Another example of
the classified nature of cyber operations is the
Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP). Only
recently, President Trump released an
unclassified version of the document,
describing the process by which the United
States assesses known cyber vulnerabilities
and risks to national security, the American
people, and the dissemination of
information. 32 This process existed, in some
form, since 2008. While a redacted version of
the document emerged through a Freedom of
Information Act request in 2016, it was only
recently communicated to the U.S. public in
un-redacted form. 33
Regardless of the reason for its classification,
the covert nature of cyber operations creates a
lack of communication within the cyber
domain. For example, there have been
virtually no publicly acknowledged cyber
actions by the United States within the last
twenty years. This is not to say that there
have not been cyber actions conducted by the
United States. For example, the cyber-worm
“Stuxnet” unleashed on Iran’s nuclear facility
has been reportedly attributed to a joint
operation between the United States and
Israel. 34 Similarly, Edward Snowden released
documents in 2013 that revealed a cyber
operation involving the United States hacking
31
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into Tsinghua University and Huawei, China's
largest telecommunications company. 35
Likewise, in the early years of the Obama
administration, the United States reportedly
developed a cyber operation, Nitro Zeus,
which was designed to disable Iran’s air
defenses, communications systems, and
power grid. 36 The operation was meant to be
employed if diplomacy failed to curb Iran’s
nuclear weapons program. 37
None of these operations were ever
acknowledged by the United States, which
means that an adversary has little-to-no
information regarding U.S. capabilities, the
credibility of its threat to impose costs, and
the U.S. commitment to imposing them.
Instead, from a potential adversary’s
perspective, the absence of cyber operations
conveys that the United States lacks the
capability to impose costs, credibility
regarding threats, the commitment to follow
through, or a combination of these three,
within the cyber domain. This does little to
alter the decision-making calculus or increase
the likelihood of deterring the adversary.
COMMUNICATING CONSEQUENCES
IN THE CYBER DOMAIN
Given this fundamental problem, the
key to increasing anticipated costs in the
cyber domain is to communicate the potential
consequences through cyber actions;
specifically, consequences that an adversary
34
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could suffer within the cyber domain. As
noted above, the use of cyber actions in this
manner is not limited to intra-cyber domain
deterrence. Potential consequences within
cyber can deter adversary actions both inside
and outside the cyber domain.
This is not a novel or unique solution. As
noted in our previous examples, nations
effectively communicated and continue to
communicate consequences to their
adversaries within other domains (i.e., air,
land, and sea) through a declaratory policy,
signaling, and follow-through. Thus, the
notion of increasing anticipated costs in the
mind of the adversary within the cyber
domain is a familiar one. However, the
challenge arises when a deterring state must
determine the means to effectively
communicate signaling and follow-through
within the cyber domain. This challenge
becomes particularly difficult when
considering both signaling and followthrough.
Declaratory Policy
The initial step of communication (a
declaratory policy) is fairly straight forward.
A deterring state should communicate its
declaratory policy through press releases,
speeches, and other engagements with the
international community. Providing a system
of rules to potential adversaries makes it clear
what actions the deterring state intends to
respond to and what targets it intends to
protect. In regards to cyber actions, a
deterring state should clarify their intent to
use cyber actions as a mechanism to impose
costs, specifically highlighting the potential
use of cyber acts to deter adversaries
regardless of the domain.
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For example, the United States has already
engaged in a version of this throughout the
last ten years. In fact, the National Cyber
Strategy, updated by President Trump in
September 2018, articulates that the United
States will impose consequences “to deter
future bad behavior.” 38 Admittedly, this
policy, and its predecessors, lack clarity and
specificity. For example, it states that it will
impose consequences on “malicious cyber
actors in response to their activities against
our nation,” but it does not define “malicious”
or what activities would trigger a response
action. 39
Additionally, aside from these rather
ambiguous proclamations, the United States
rarely communicates more specific threats.
For example, in the Stuxnet and Nitro Zeus
operations above, the United States could
have communicated a specific declaratory
policy to Iran that any continued development
of their nuclear weapons program would
result in a debilitating cyber response. At the
very least, this would have drawn a clear line
in the sand, allowing Iran to better understand
the possible costs and consider those costs
prior to continuing their nuclear weapons
program.
The importance of a clear declaratory policy
should not be undervalued. Lack of clarity
does not usually serve to benefit the deterring
state. As noted in the Chinese ASAT test
discussed above, failure to communicate the
system of rules typically serves to confuse the
adversary and frustrate deterrence efforts.
Naturally, adversaries are more likely to use
this ambiguity as an excuse to “poke and
prod” a deterring state to determine what
provokes a response.
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Therefore, as in other domains, a critical first
step to successfully employing cyber acts to
communicate potential consequences is to
establish a clear declaratory policy and
communicate that policy to potential
adversaries.
Signaling and Follow-Through
Once a clear declaratory policy has
been established, a deterring state should be
prepared to utilize the next steps in the
communication process to ensure adversaries
understand its system of rules, commitment,
and credibility and better calculate the
potential costs. These next steps are the use
of signaling and follow-through.
Unfortunately, in the cyber domain, the use of
signaling and follow-through is nascent. For
example, neither the United States nor any
other nation has ever publically
acknowledged employing a cyber operation,
much less used a cyber operation for pure
signaling reasons. However, deterring states
have used signaling and follow-through
mechanisms throughout history in other
domains. These can be used to form a
baseline of what is required for an effective
signal and follow-through.
Based on a study of successful signaling and
follow-through actions, there are five
essential characteristics:
1. Deterring State Self-Identification
Any effective signal and follow-through must
communicate the deterring state’s identity.
Identification is important in order for the
adversary to link the action to the declaratory
policy and to confirm the intended or actual
enforcement of the system of rules, the
commitment to enforcement, and the
credibility of future threats. If a challenger
does not know who conducted the signal or
response, they are less likely to consider these
actions in future decisions regarding that

state, losing the desired effects of the
operation.
In the cyber domain, the difficulty of
attribution (the ability to identify the actor) is
a recurring issue. Some states tend to
capitalize on this technical challenge when
engaging in covert operations. As a result,
states who are the victim of cyber acts may be
unwilling to respond (in any domain) out of
the fear of inaccurate attribution. Thus, an
argument could be made that signaling could
undermine this tactical advantage.
Importantly, this article does not advocate for
the complete elimination of covert cyber
operations. Rather, covert cyber operations
could still be utilized, when appropriate;
similarly to how states continue to employ
both covert and overt air, land, or sea
operations. There is no doubt that these
covert operations can have a deterrent effect.
However, with signaling and follow-through
actions, it is important to identify the actor
because the purpose of the signal or response
is to communicate a message. That message
is lost if the deterring state is not clearly
identified.
2. Clear Message
Any signal or follow-through should
communicate the commitment and credibility
in clear terms. In other words, the message
must indicate that the deterring state is
committed and their threat is credible; there is
rarely a benefit to ambiguity in this regard.
Additionally, the message should be closely
linked to the system of rules/declaratory
policy.
Ideally, a signal would communicate a
message along these lines: “You appear to be
preparing to do [x]. According to our
declaratory policy, we will respond to your
action by doing [y]. We have the capability
and commitment to respond in this manner.
This action is to confirm our intent to follow-
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through on this declaratory policy.”
Similarly, a follow-through action should
communicate a message along these lines:
“You have done [x]. According to our
declaratory policy, we informed you that we
would response to your action by doing [y].
We have conducted this action in accordance
with our declaratory policy.”
3. Capability Demonstration
Communication via signaling and followthrough requires that the deterring state
adequately demonstrate the capability to
conduct the actions specified in their
declaratory policy. If the deterring state
cannot demonstrate their capacity to impose
the threatened costs, it is unlikely to factor
into an adversary’s decision calculus. If, for
example, the Chinese ASAT missile test was
not successful, a space faring nation that was
contemplating a challenge would not give any
weight to the threatened costs. Similarly, in
the cyber domain, if a threatened action is not
demonstrated as being technically feasible, it
will have little effect on an adversary’s
calculus.
4. Tailoring to the Target
A signal or response must be carefully
tailored to the adversary, focusing on how the
capability is likely to impact their cost
determination. In other words, the message
must “speak the language” of the adversary
and concentrate on those costs that will
persuade the adversary. For example, if the
challenger lacks any functioning satellite, it is
doubtful that China’s recent ASAT missile
test would alter their decision calculus.
Similarly, if a state lacks a dependency on
cyber capabilities, employing adverse cyber
acts would prove fruitless.
This can be the most complicated of the
requirements because knowing what the
adversary values is not always obvious.
Nuclear deterrence was simpler because total
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destruction is a universally feared cost.
However, determining what North Korea’s
leader, Kim Jong-un, values is exponentially
harder, and threatening total destruction tends
to lose its effectiveness without any followthrough. Nevertheless, it is the job of the
deterring state to identify what the adversary
values and then tailor a signal or response to
increase their anticipated costs.
5. Adversary Identification
While it is inherent in the previous
characteristics, it is important to expressly
state the significance of identifying the
adversary in a signal or follow-through action.
In other words, the deterring state should
identify the target state. This characteristic
has two parts. First, the deterring state should
properly identify the target state before any
signaling or follow-through action. This
ensures the response is properly tailored,
demonstrating the correct capability, and
sending the correct message. In the event a
deterring state misidentifies the adversary and
then uses the above requirements to tailor a
signal or response, this effort will have little
effect on the actual challenger. In fact, it
might even embolden an actor who believes
they can operate without consequence.
Second, it must also identify the target within
the signal or follow-through. This ensures the
intended receiver knows they are the intended
receiver. This particular aspect tends to be
more important in the domains that lack clear
borders (i.e., cyber). In a traditional domain,
proximity to a state’s border, territorial
waters, or airspace was sufficient to identify
them as the target state. However, in a
borderless domain, a deterring state must be
more overt, ensuring any errant recipients of
the message are aware of its intended target.
Case Studies: Revisited
The deterrence examples provided in
Part I illustrate how the five characteristics for
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communicating consequences determine
successful signaling in other domains.
1. U.S. Deterrence of a Soviet Union
Nuclear Strike
When the declaratory policy of “massive
retaliation” alone did not appear to be
deterring the Soviet Union, the United States
demonstrated its credibility and commitment
through signaling. In this instance, signaling
was the development, testing, and deployment
of nuclear weapons for the nuclear triad. As a
prominent example, this analysis focuses on
development and testing of nuclear weapons
and delivery systems (Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles, or ICBMs).
Aside from the second characteristic (a clear
message) which is discussed below, the
testing of nuclear weapons and ICBMs met
the requirements of a successful signal. First,
during the height of the Cold War, there was
no question regarding which country was
developing nuclear weapons and ICBMs and
then testing various prototypes. The tests
were detectable around the world, and the
United States did not hide these tests.
Second, each test served to demonstrate the
U.S. capability to strike the Soviet Union.
Third, the message was tailored to the Soviet
Union. While nuclear deterrence did not
require much, if any, tailoring, the United
States did tailor their testing to the Soviet
Union, the only other peer competitor in the
development and deployment of nuclear
weapons and ICBMs. Fourth, identifying the
target of U.S. signaling was rather easy since
there were few nuclear capable states and
even fewer to deter. If there was any
question, the development of ICBMs that
40
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possessed the range to reach the Soviet Union
was fairly clear evidence that the Soviet
Union was the primary target.
With regard to clarity of the message, the
testing conducted by the United States was an
attempt to clearly communicate U.S.
commitment to developing, maintaining, and
deploying functional nuclear weapons.
Unfortunately, this message was open to
misperception. Ideally, the United States
should have declared: “The Soviet Union
appears to be preparing to launch a nuclear
strike. According to our declaratory policy,
the United States will respond to any nuclear
strike by engaging in a massive retaliatory
strike, effectively destroying the full range of
value targets in the Soviet Union. The United
States has the capability and commitment to
respond in this manner. This test of [a
nuclear weapon or its delivery system] is to
confirm U.S. intent to follow-through on this
declaratory policy.” However, this message
was often lost, leaving many within the Soviet
Union to believe that the United States was
preparing to launch a first strike. This was a
version of the “security dilemma,” leading to
multiple crises and near-breakdowns of
deterrence throughout the Cold War. 40
2. U.S. Deterrence of North Korea
After North Korea launched its twentieth
ballistic missile in 2017 and tested what many
believed to be a thermonuclear device,
President Trump announced that he was
stationing three carrier strike groups in the
area of operations in close proximity to North
Korea. Once there, the U.S. Navy conducted
a joint exercise with participation from South
Korean and Japanese warships. This was, in
05/soviet-side-1983-war-scare, accessed 5 November
2018; and also The John F. Kennedy Presidential
Library and Museum, Cuban Missile Crisis,
https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-inhistory/cuban-missile-crisis, accessed 8 November
2018.
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no uncertain terms, a signal to North Korea
that possessed each of the five characteristics.

test), and the proximity of the naval assets to
North Korea.

First, the deterring state was identified. When
the carrier strike groups arrived off the coast
of North Korea, there was no confusion over
whether they were assets of the United States.
President Trump announced the stationing of
the naval assets to the area, and each flew the
U.S. flag. It should be noted that it is rare for
the United States to announce the location of
their carriers, so the publication served to
remove any doubt that these assets belonged
to the United States. 41

While the overall success of the U.S.
deterrence strategy for North Korea is still
being determined, this signaling example
appears to have been a successful
communication of U.S. intent, commitment,
and credibility.

Second, the message was clear; given the
timing of President Trump’s deployment of
the naval assets, which occurred shortly after
North Korea’s twentieth test of a ballistic
missile, the stationing of the carrier strike
groups properly linked the actions of North
Korea to the response action. It was then
further linked to the U.S. declaratory policy
on stopping nuclear proliferation. Third, the
mere presence of the carrier strike groups in
the vicinity demonstrated U.S. capability to
be in Korean waters within a matter of days.
Further, while inside the Seventh Fleet Area
of Operations, the carrier strike groups
conducted an exercise, demonstrating their
ability to work together against a common
target.

3. China’s Deterrence of Space-Based
Operations
China recently conducted another ASAT test
of the DN-3 anti-satellite interceptor, which is
capable of being launched from land, directly
ascending, and striking a satellite orbiting
Earth. As discussed in Part I, this action was
not as effective as it could have been if it had
accomplished the first step of communicating
a deterrence strategy—communicating the
declaratory policy. Consequently, adversaries
were unable to determine the threshold for
such a response action or to make sense of
China’s intent.

Fourth, the message was tailored to North
Korea and Kim Jung-un, whose actions
confirmed that he does not respond to a light
touch and that he pays close attention to the
movements of U.S. strategic assets near the
Korean peninsula. 42 Finally, the United
States properly identified North Korea as their
target state. This was accomplished through
statements by President Trump, the timing of
the response action (shortly after the missile

Despite this, there were some deterrence
benefits of the test, and it did possess many of
the requirements of an effective signal. First,
due to the nature of the operation and the
constant monitoring of space launches, it was
obvious to determine the identity of the
launching state. Second, this was, if nothing
else, a capability demonstration—ensuring
everyone capable of detecting the launch was
aware of China’s ability to strike space assets
from a terrestrial launch. Third, it was
tailored to, what we assume is, the target
states—all space-faring nations. While most
signals should consider engaging in a more
tailored approach, in rare circumstances (for
example, nuclear deterrence), no specific
tailoring is needed if simply trying to
communicate a capability.
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The two most glaring omissions from China’s
ASAT test were that the message was not
clear and the target states were not identified.
This is largely due to the disguising of the
launch as a missile defense interceptor test.
As a result, China’s message was ambiguous,
not tied to a declaratory policy, and lacking
any indication of a system of rules. Coupled
with the lack of a clear identification of the
target states, an adversary is unlikely to know
whether they were an intended recipient and
what message to take from this action.

above. Instead of publicly voicing the
purpose of the mission, the United States
relied on a common practice associated with
international waters and the law of the sea—
freedom of navigation. 45 While uninformed
observers might be confused by the action,
the message was clear to a savvy international
diplomat. Notably, the Chinese understood
the message, later condemning the operation
by stating that “the operation had violated
international and Chinese law and seriously
harmed Beijing’s sovereignty and security.” 46

These omissions hinder the deterrent effect of
China’s ASAT test. As a result, there
continues to be uncertainty regarding space
assets and China’s position.

Third, the sending of the U.S.S. McCain, a
destroyer, was a demonstration of the
capability of the U.S. Navy. While it did not
engage in a hostile act (according to U.S.
policy), the ability to project power in the area
was an indication of the ability to do so later.
Fourth, this action was tailored to the Chinese
and their claim over the South China Sea,
specifically communicating the U.S. position
on the nature of the area. Finally, given the
proximity of the operation to both China and
the disputed area, the target state was
identified. The success of this signaling
action can be seen by the Chinese response,
which stated, “China is resolutely opposed to
this kind of show of force . . . .” 47

4. U.S. Deterrence of China’s Claim to the
South China Sea
When the U.S.S. John S. McCain, a U.S.
Navy destroyer, traveled close to Mischief
Reef in the Spratly Islands, there was little
doubt that this maneuver was meant to send a
message regarding the U.S. position over the
disputed area. In fact, this was the third
FONOP mission during the Trump
presidency, with the administration vowing to
conduct more operations in the area. 43 This
signaling measure met the requirements for an
effective signal.
First, similarly to the carrier strike group
stationed off the coast of North Korea, the
identification of the U.S. destroyer was
indicated by the flags flown aboard. In
addition, when approached by the Chinese sea
craft, the U.S.S. McCain identified itself, and
China later declared the U.S. action as
“provocative.” 44
Second, the message was clear, albeit not
necessarily articulated in the manner proposed

Cyber Consequences
The same requirements for an
effective signal and follow-through action in
other domains can be translated to the cyber
domain. Therefore, any suggested cyber
signaling or follow-through must meet each
of the above characteristics for the best
chance of being effective. Consequently, any
proposed solution must (a) disclose the
identity of the deterring state; (b) clearly
communicate the message; (c) demonstrate
the capabilities of the deterring state; (d) be
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tailored to the target adversary; and (e)
properly identify the adversary.
1. Proposed Solution: “Loud” Cyber
Weapons
If the United States employed “loud” cyber
weapons as signals and follow-through
actions within the cyber domain, it would
have a better chance of effectively
communicating its system of rules, its
commitment, and the credibility of its threats.
As defined above, loud cyber weapons are
cyber weapons that can be definitively traced
to the actor; they do not disguise the source,
the nature, or the effects. When employing
loud cyber weapons, the actor does not
obscure the operation or its source from being
discovered by the victim and correctly
attributed.
As proposed, the United States would employ
loud cyber weapons consistent with their
declaratory policy and in response to adverse
actions—whether these actions were
employed in the cyber domain or other
domains. These would functionally serve as a
cyber “show of force,” commonly practiced in
other domains. When evaluated under the
requirements outlined above, loud cyber
weapons meet all the requirements of an
effective signal and follow-through.
a. Self-Identification
By its nature, a loud cyber weapon identifies
its origin and architect; it does not disguise
these in an effort to achieve surprise. This
provides the needed link between the act, the
effects, and the deterring state. It informs the
adversary about who carried out the act,
confirms enforcement of the deterring state’s
system of rules, and demonstrates the
deterer’s commitment to enforcement and
maintaining credibility of future threats. The
result is that the challenger has no question
about who coordinated the act and is able to
determine the deterring state’s intent.
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With covert cyber weapons, an adversary may
know of the effects of an act, but not know
who was behind it. This undermines the
effectiveness of signal and follow-through.
Employing loud cyber weapons allows
adversaries to better estimate the costs of any
potential response from the deterring state.
Consequently, future deterrence messages and
threats will likely be taken more seriously and
should increase the adversary’s anticipated
costs.
b. Clear Message
Loud cyber weapons offer a unique advantage
over covert cyber weapons and conventional
weapons. With both covert cyber weapons
and conventional weapons, the message can
be lost if not properly executed or linked to
the initial action and declaratory policy. Loud
cyber weapons, on the other hand, can
communicate the message more overtly,
through incorporation into code. Since covert
cyber operations attempt to disguise their
identity, a deterring state is unwilling to put
identifying information within the code; in
fact, they often attempt to hide such
indicators. Even if the deterring states does
not wish to be so direct, it can fall back to
employing cyber weapons in the same manner
as conventional signaling and follow-through
actions. This can be done by linking loud
cyber operations through public statements or
conducting the operation soon after the
triggering event. In either case, the adversary
is able to receive a clear message, which will
be factored into their future decision calculus.
c. Capability Demonstration
This is perhaps the most beneficial aspect of
loud cyber weapons. With the current covert
nature of cyber weapons, many state and nonstate actors suspect that the world powers,
including the United States, have significant
cyber capabilities. However, there is
confusion over their actual capabilities
because they are rarely publically
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acknowledged. As a result, an adversary is
left to guess the potential costs that would be
imposed by these deterring states. The only
guidance they have in anticipating the costs
are vague policies by the world powers. For
example, one U.S. policy declares that it will
respond “through its defense capabilities . . .
at a time, in a manner, and in a place of our
choosing . . . .” 48 This does little to
communicate the anticipated costs to potential
challengers.
Furthermore, many adversaries might not
anticipate any cost imposition due to a lack of
publicity of past efforts by these world
powers to respond to cyber acts or signal their
intent to do so. Much like an ASAT missile
test that fails to launch successfully, a lack of
known cyber responses does little to deter
adversaries.
Loud cyber weapons offer a solution to this.
By not disguising the effects, they broadcast
the deterring state’s capabilities to adversaries
and beyond while demonstrating state
commitment to enforcing rules and bolstering
the credibility of threats. For example, many
adversaries might actually be subject to a
signal or follow-through response from the
United States, but due to the covert nature of
the operation, the effects (and therefore, the
capabilities) are unknown to the target. More
overt use of cyber weapons clears up any
ambiguity surrounding cyber operations and
fully informs adversaries of the deterring
state’s policy. Consequently, potential
challengers are better equipped to calculate
anticipated costs associated with an adverse
action.
d. Tailoring to the Target
Like conventional tactics, loud cyber weapons
offer the flexibility to be tailored to the
specific target actor. Importantly, though,
loud cyber weapons expand the spectrum of
48

DOD, Cyber Strategy, 11.

options available to deterring states when
determining how to signal or follow-through,
both within the cyber domain and outside of
it. For instance, if the United States wanted to
signal to North Korea that it would not
tolerate their continued nuclear weapon
development, they could employ options
ranging from a traditional show of force (i.e.,
aircraft flying in close proximity, a carrier
strike group being stationed in the area, or
amassing troops in South Korea) or it could
employ a loud cyber weapon. Thus, loud
cyber weapons provide an expanded set of
viable options to tailor the message to the
target actor’s specific interests. Accordingly,
the deterring state is better equipped to tailor
its cost impositions, and consequently, an
adversary is better positioned to assess the
range of likely costs the deterring state may
impose.
e. Adversary Identification
As explained above, this requirement has two
functions. First, proper identification helps
the deterring state better tailor the signal or
follow-through to the target state. Second, it
helps identify the target state, which is
particularly important when operating within
a borderless domain.
Loud cyber weapons do not necessarily offer
an advantage over conventional and covert
cyber weapons in the first function of this
requirement; it is equally important to
properly identify the actor in all domains in
order to properly tailor the signal or followthrough action. But, perhaps it is more
important to correctly identify the target actor
when employing loud cyber weapons. As
compared to covert cyber weapons, loud
cyber weapons will actually make matters
worse in the event that a deterring state
misidentifies the challenger. For example, if
a covert cyber weapon were targeted at the
wrong actor, the target might not even know
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they were the victim of a deterrence response;
the same is not true for loud cyber weapons.
The issue does arise in other domains, albeit,
with less difficulty of attributing
responsibility to deterring states.
Much is made of the attribution problem for
identifying adversaries in cyber operations.
Fortunately, many of the world powers are
getting better at attributing cyber actions.
Instead, the more recent challenge is timely
attribution, and this complicates, but does not
foreclose, deterrence operations. After all, it
is the deterring state’s obligation to link the
previous adverse act to its response, even if
delayed.
Additionally, the second function is equally
important. Because the cyber domain is
borderless and nations are interconnected,
there is always possible an errant spread of
the cyber weapon (for example, a worm that
propagates further than intended). So, it is
important for loud cyber weapons to
specifically name the target to avoid potential
misperception and escalation. All things
considered, as long as a state properly
identifies the target actor, loud cyber weapons
meet the requirements of an effective
signal/response.
2. Challenges
While loud cyber weapons offer an effective
method for signaling and follow-through
actions, certain challenges exist in practically
employing them.
First, the effectiveness of a deterrence
strategy relies heavily on anticipated cost
imposition; however, in the cyber domain, the
costs are all relatively low compared to other
domains. For example, in nuclear deterrence,
the likely cost is a retaliatory strike that would
most likely result in significant (if not, total)
destruction. An adversary is less willing to
provoke this result; there is a significantly
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narrow margin of error in nuclear deterrence.
For the cyber domain, the most likely damage
for a signal or follow-through action is
relatively minor (perhaps a computer or
network is temporarily inoperable or data is
lost), and the cost is relatively small. A
passionate adversary is unlikely to be deterred
by such an insignificant consequence.
However, the key to employing loud cyber
weapons (like deterrence in all domains) lies
in the tailoring of the response to the target;
after all, not all actors will be deterred by the
same costs. For those actors who will not be
deterred by cyber weapons (whether covert or
overt), imposing such a cost would not be
effective, and the deterring state should
consider other signals or follow-through
options (for example, a different domain).
Further along these lines, due to the
likelihood of low cost imposition, many
adversaries will be more willing to test the
deterring state’s resolve. This is in marked
contrast to other domains. As discussed
above, in nuclear deterrence, the margin of
error is narrow, but in the cyber domain,
drastic retaliation is unlikely, and may offer
little added signaling value. Given a panoply
of available cross-domain options, challengers
may poke and prod the cyber deterring state
in an effort to determine whether it is truly
committed to its system of rules.
However, this only cements the importance of
fully forming a deterrence strategy. A
deterring state must contemplate various
scenarios and tailored responses, even outside
of cyber weapons and the cyber domain. This
should be distilled in the nation’s system of
rules. Furthermore, low magnitude, crossdomain retaliation reinforces the need to tailor
signals and follow-through actions to the
effects which will most likely impact an
actor’s decision calculus.
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Second, there are often questions regarding
the legality of using cyber weapons,
especially when there is a use of force
implication. Due to the many questions on
how international law applies to cyber
operations (an area that is very unsettled at
this point), this is a complex topic that should
be more fully evaluated. In any case, it does
not foreclose use of loud cyber weapons
entirely. Instead, it is incumbent upon the
deterring state to examine international law
applicable to cyber operations and carefully
craft a signal and follow-through action that
does not run afoul of international law. With
that said, the use of loud cyber weapons may
actually help states provide more clarity to the
international community on their position
regarding the law governing cyber operations,
which is currently being defined and refined
by academics. 49

will largely control the potential for
misperception. Understandably, however,
this is not fool-proof. Therefore, a deterring
state must be prepared for potential
misperception and accept an enhanced
element of transparency for their loud cyber
operations. For escalation, it is possible for
cyber weapons to aggravate matters; two
nations may go back-and-forth, increasing
tensions rather than resolving them. This is
an issue that is not unique to loud cyber
weapons. Any signal or follow-through
action can escalate matters. Therefore, it is
up to the deterring state to consider this
potential consequence and factor that into
their decision.
CONCLUSION

Third, given the nature of cyber weapons
(they suffer from being rendered obsolete
over time and can rarely be used after an actor
learns of their vulnerability), there is a
significant chance that using loud cyber
weapons could compromise a nation’s cache
of cyber weapons. Furthermore, considering
the various disparate agencies within a
government that operate in the cyber domain
and the somewhat finite availability of cyber
weapons, use of loud cyber weapons could
cause internal conflicts and degrade some
operations. Therefore, if loud cyber weapons
are employed, a deterring state must carefully
consider these practical complications. 50

A necessary component to any
deterrence strategy is communication; it
allows the adversary to better estimate costs,
preparing the way for a more accurate
decision calculus. Unfortunately, finding a
cyber equivalent for deterrence
communication has been somewhat illusory.
Nevertheless, the key to communicating
potential costs in the cyber domain is not
groundbreaking; nations need only look to
their traditional methods from other domains
(i.e., signaling and follow-through). What is
unique, on the other hand, is the suggested
solution—loud cyber weapons. Upon closer
examination of loud cyber weapons, there is
support for their use in the characteristics of
traditional signaling and response actions.

Fourth, use of loud cyber weapons may create
problems of misperception and escalation.
For misperception, the clarity of the state’s
message and, ironically, its capacity to
authenticate against “false flag” operations

While this paper argues for use of loud cyber
operations, there are many other concerns that
must be addressed prior to their employment.
For example, what actions would generate a
response? What effects would be employed?

49

50

Michael N. Schmitt, ed., Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the
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How should a deterring state better
incorporate loud cyber weapons into a unified
deterrence posture? These concerns should
be considered and discussed.
Regardless, the proposal here represents a
viable solution to lack of communication
within the cyber domain. In short, loud cyber
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weapons provide nations with a useful tool for
deterrence in the cyber domain to effectively
communicate potential costs of a challenger’s
action, thereby affecting the decision calculus
of adversaries and increasing the likelihood of
success.

Article

Building Beyond Samba and Soccer: Why Brazil Ventured a
Nuclear Program
Saint-Clair Lima da Silva
Contrary to conventional wisdom on Brazil as a case of nuclear proliferation, archival evidence indicates
that, rather than geopolitical rivalry with Argentina, enduring desire for national autonomy—honor more
than sword or shield—drove Brazil during the 1980s to master its own uranium enrichment cycle.

In 1987, the President of Brazil
officially announced Brazilian mastery of the
uranium enrichment cycle, unleashing a wideranging fear that the newly acquired capacity
would be tied to construction of a nuclear
bomb. 1
Although this unsettling prospect never
materialized, the Brazilian nuclear program
remains steeped in controversy and engages
different theories for why the Brazilian
government started it in the first place.
Explanations such as “extreme megalomania
to create the bomb” 2 or “to serve the interests
of German private capital, which provided
technology and equipment for the program,” 3
seem to be, to say the least, precipitate. Most
of the debate has been grounded on
speculations rather than on documented
evidence. Recently, reams of documentation
on nuclear statecraft have become available
through declassification. These documents
shed light on a wide range of subjects about
the international politics of nuclear weapons,
and they have the potential to reshape the
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Force (FAB) currently teaches at the Brazilian Air
Force Academy, Pirassununga – SP, Brazil.
2
Revista Veja, “Sarney Arma Seu Ciclo," September
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ways that scholars think about important
aspects of the nuclear age. 4
This study focuses on the reasons that led
Brazil, “a peaceful country by tradition and
belief,” to pursue nuclear technology, a costly
endeavor heavily condemned within the
international community. A longstanding
assumption in nuclear proliferation
discussions is that states seek to develop
nuclear weapons when they face a significant
military threat to their security that cannot be
met through alternative means; if they do not
suffer such threats, they will voluntarily
remain non-nuclear states 5.
Students familiar with South American
history might argue that this concept could, de
facto, explain the Brazilian case. Brazil and
Argentina, the most influential countries in
South America, have been rivals since before
their independence from Spain and Portugal
was achieved. During negotiations for the
Latin American Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone
treaty (NWFZ) between 1964 and 1967, the
two countries sought to preserve the right to
conduct “Peaceful Nuclear Explosions”
4

This paper relies on extensive use of primary sources
made available by the Nuclear Proliferation
International History Project in the Woodrow Wilson
International Center in collaboration with Fundação
Getúlio Vargas. I would like to record my special
obligation to those institutions.
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(PNEs), which they argued could augment
their security, sovereignty, socioeconomic
prosperity, and prestige.
Our research, however, challenges the
traditional wisdom asserting that Brazil
attempted to develop nuclear weapons to face
Argentina in an arms race. The key
independent variable in the Brazilian decision
to start a nuclear program does not rest on a
security dilemma. It builds on a rooted
conception of Brazil’s national identity:
specifically, its value on autonomy.
Autonomy is a fundamental concept for
Brazilian foreign policy, but one not generally
well understood in the North Atlantic World.
The construction of a nuclear bomb was never
a primary goal for Brazil. The program
materialized Brazilian long-lasting aspiration
for technological independence and,
ultimately, state independence.
The Brazilian government initiated the secret
“Autonomous Program,” also known as the
parallel program, in 1978, under American
pressure for its attempt to develop nuclear
technology. This essay builds the theoretical
argument for why the Autonomous Program,
rather than responding to the supposed
compelling security threat from Argentina,
addressed a broader, national, sovereign
desire for greater autonomy in the direction of
Brazil’s foreign affairs.
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concept is largely based on the Neorealist
theory of International Relations, in which
states exist within an anarchical system and
must, therefore, rely on self-help to protect
their sovereignty and national security.
Without rejecting this claim, Scott Sagan, in
his work "Why Do States Build Nuclear
Weapons?” provided a more comprehensive
approach to the study of nuclear proliferation.
Sagan suggested three models to assess the
reasons motivating the search for a nuclear
bomb. He held that the actions of a state in
the international system should be assessed
not only through the security lens but also by
a set of domestic and cognitive variables,
such as state institutions, the effect of societal
decision-makers on foreign policy, and
perceptions (or misperceptions) of systemic
pressures. 7
A distinct approach to the subject was
developed by Victor Cha when analyzing
North Korea’s nuclear endeavor. 8 Cha used
metaphors to represent the reasons behind the
nuclearization of a state. His first image was
the shield that would ensure against acts by
the United States and others to crush the
North Korean regime. Sword was the second
symbol, representing aggressive and
revisionist purposes. Cha’s third metaphor
was the badge, a symbol of prestige for an
otherwise bankrupt regime.

The predominant tendency in
studying nuclear proliferation is to assume
that external threats to state security drive
efforts to reach the nuclear threshold. 6 This

The political scientist Jacques Haymans
developed a compelling theory based on the
notion that decisions to go or not to go
nuclear reflect the psychology of the leaders
who make them. 9 Haymans argued that big
decisions are likely to stem from something
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9

Jacques E. C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear
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other than a straightforward material costbenefit calculation. In the case of the decision
to go nuclear, which is located in the arena of
high international politics, the relevant factors
are nevertheless found in the leader's national
identity conception. In his words, “there are
discrete decisionmaking pathways leading
from different national identity conceptions,
through emotions, to ultimate nuclear
choices.”

THE BRAZILIAN NUCLEAR
PROGRAM IN HISTORY
Brazilian internal debates on nuclear
energy started in 1945 when the country was
supplying atomic minerals for the Manhattan
Project. 11 By that time, deliberations
concerned whether to utilize and preserve the
country’s own natural resources to produce
atomic energy. 12

This research adopts Scott Sagan’s framework
to analyze the Brazilian case in that it
provides distinct and well-defined models to
explain why states engage in proliferation.
Sagan’s first approach is the traditional
“security model,” according to which states
build nuclear weapons to increase national
security against foreign threats, especially
nuclear threats. The “domestic politics
model” envisions nuclear weapons as political
tools used to advance parochial domestic and
bureaucratic interests. The third line of
reasoning, the “norms model,” considers the
fact that weapons acquisition, or weapons
development, provides an essential normative
symbol of a state’s modernity and identity. 10
It is precisely this model that provides the
strongest explanation for Brazil’s nuclear
trajectory.

In 1947, the Brazilian National Security
Council, comprising the president and the
most important ministries in his cabinet, held
a meeting to discuss a proposal made by the
United States for the creation of an
international acquisitions institution. The
new organization would have exclusive rights
for the acquisition of raw materials in the
production of nuclear fuels using a quota
system.

In the next pages, we analyze the
contributions of each of these three models on
the Brazilian impetus to achieve nuclear
capability.

In its response, Brazil supported the creation
of the international agency charged with the
control of atomic minerals. Nevertheless, the
reply stated that “because Brazil was poor in
current fuels, such as coal, we believe that it
should not relinquish the right to utilize its
own raw material for peaceful purposes and
under the control of the international agency,

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
10
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11
Brazil has known resources of 278,000 tons of
uranium—5% of world total.

12

During this meeting, the primary concern of
Brazilian officials was possible restrictions by
outside authority of the country’s minerals
from its own soil for energy production. The
discussion focused on a statement that would
accept the American proposal while ensuring
the use of raw minerals as an alternative
source of energy for Brazil.
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after having supplied the quota assigned to it
for world distribution.” 13
Several years later, Brazil acquired its first
research reactor, thanks to a cooperation
agreement signed with the United States
under the program “Atoms for Peace.” In the
early 1950s, Brazilian activities in the nuclear
sector were essentially confined to academic
and theoretical studies on the nature of the
materials. In 1964, beginning a pattern that
would encompass almost all South America, a
coup and permanent military government took
control in Brazil. The military ruled the
country until 1985, and the decision to
develop indigenous nuclear technology
materialized, earlier, in 1972. At that time,
Brazil acquired a uranium power reactor from
the United States, which supported its first
nuclear power plant: Angra I.
The world oil crisis of 1973 advanced
Brazilian nuclear plans and, in 1975, Brazil
signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with
West Germany. The agreement envisioned
the construction of eight nuclear power plants
along with full technology transfer related to
the nuclear fuel cycle, and the design,
engineering, and manufacturing of nuclear
power plant components.
Although Brazil invested heavily to assemble
an industrial structure and acquire technology
required for the construction of nuclear power
plants and to produce uranium concentrate,
the 1970s witnessed renewed international
concern against nuclear proliferation. India
successfully tested its nuclear device (1974),
and numerous developing countries such as
13
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14
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Argentina, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, South
Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil made strides in the
field of nuclear technology. 14 In response,
U.S. President Jimmy Carter, encouraged by
the American Congress, made nuclear nonproliferation a top policy priority early in his
administration. Even before entering office,
in November 1976, Carter gave a speech that
set the tone for a very assertive stance on nonproliferation, specifically, to block the sale of
fuel reprocessing plants from France and
West Germany, respectively, to Pakistan and
Brazil.
Carter’s vice-president, Walter Mondale, in
an official visit to FRG President Helmut
Schmidt, reiterated his administration’s
viewpoint and requested that the GermanBrazilian agreement be suspended for
review. 15 The demand triggered negative
responses from both the Brazilian and
German administrations and led to an
immediate souring of US-Brazil relations.
Expressing Brazilian government reaction, an
official of the Ministry of Mines and Energy
stated that the nuclear program would
continue…
“at least to the extent it depends on us, against
all internal and external pressures. The
Germans know that we acted with seriousness
in signing the agreement. We do not want the
atomic bomb. We want to be independent, to
construct our future, and to prevent (the
effects of) any future world petroleum and
energy crisis. Brazil will not give way.” 16
Constraints imposed by the United States,
perceived as an external actor meddling in the
diplomatic-efforts-stalled-brazils-nuclear-program1970s.
15
Ibid. FRG stood for Federal Republic of Germany
(West Germany).
16
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“Brazilian Public Reaction to US Nuclear Policies,"
History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive,
National Archives and Records Administration.
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country’s sovereignty, had great bearing on
technical and political aspects of Brazil’s
nuclear program. The construction of Angra I
by the American company Westinghouse was
severely delayed, as were the Angra II and
Angra III plants, also specified in the initial
agreement. U.S. opposition to the transfer of
German ultracentrifugation technology led to
a German-Brazilian joint investment focusing
on the development of enrichment by jet
nozzle, which ultimately proved to be
technically and economically impractical.
Most important were the safeguards placed in
the arrangement between Brazil and Germany
and the subsequent tripartite agreement with
the IAEA. Together, they imposed severe
limits to the range of research and
experimentation that could be performed in
Brazil with materials, technology, and
facilities associated with the German
agreement.
The development of nuclear technology
through cooperative agreements with other
countries could not meet Brazil’s aspirations.
Given the constraints imposed by major
powers and international regimes, if the
country wanted to make real progress on
enrichment technology, the argument went, it
would have to work covertly and by
cooperating with other countries on the
margins of nuclear regimes. The rationale led
to the creation, in 1978, of the Autonomous
Nuclear Program, also known as the parallel
program, free of safeguards and supposed to
develop Brazil’s indigenous enrichment
process.
Military and civilian institutions were secretly
assigned specific pieces of the nuclear project.
17

Memorandum (1), Danilo Venturini to João Baptista
de Oliveira Figueiredo, February 21, 1985, SecretaryGeneral of the National Security Council, Autonomous
Projects in the Nuclear Field, Brazilian Nuclear
History, Nuclear Proliferation International History
Project, Wilson Center.
18
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The strategy was based on an association
between the technical areas of the Navy,
Army, Air Force and the National Nuclear
Energy Commission (CNEN), supervised by
the General Secretariat of the National
Security Council. Several projects were
assigned to the participating institutions. 17
The Air Force was responsible for developing
the technology of uranium enrichment by
laser. The Army would develop the
technology of nuclear-pure graphite, with the
objective of manufacturing moderators for
natural uranium reactors. CNEN was
assigned a variety of projects, ranging from
the production of uranium compounds
(natural and enriched), fuel reprocessing for
the production of plutonium, and the
preparation of metallic uranium and its
applications.
Ultimately, two projects assigned to the Navy
stood out: Project Cyclone, aimed at uranium
enrichment through the process of
ultracentrifugation, and Remo, which focused
on the development of naval propulsion
technology to equip nuclear submarines. 18
According to the report of a former Minister
of the Navy, the construction of the first
ultracentrifuge was completed in December
1981 through the work of seven engineers
under the leadership of a Navy officer who
had been studying nuclear energy in the
United States from 1975 to 1978. 19 The
minister explained that “among the
technicians who worked on its development,
there was a group dedicated exclusively to the
nationalization of components, since they
could not be purchased abroad, as a result of
external pressures contrary to our project.” 20

19
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In September 1982, an isotopic uranium
enrichment experience was successful,
employing an entirely indigenous
ultracentrifuge. In September 1984 the
operation of the first mini-cascade of
ultracentrifuges was initiated. Three years
later, after the first centrifuges “accumulated
thousands of hours of operation,” José
Sarney, the first civilian president after the
military dictatorship, officially announced
Brazilian mastery of the uranium enrichment
cycle. In his announcement, Sarney
highlighted “a fact of greater transcendence in
the scientific history of the country.” 21
Worth noting, the announcement was not
followed by the development of a nuclear
bomb or attempts to develop or acquire
vehicles to deliver a nuclear warhead
(strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic
missiles, or submarine-launched ballistic
missiles). Presumably, the country took the
opposite direction because in 1988 Brazil
promulgated a new constitution where it
openly renounced the development of nuclear
weapons.
In 1991, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for
Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
(ABACC) was set up. 22 Conversations led to
the Quadripartite Agreement among Brazil,
Argentina, ABACC and the IAEA, which
entered into force in 1994 with full-scope
safeguards under IAEA auspices including
naval facilities.
Brazil became a member of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group in 1996. The country
traditionally opposed the Nuclear Non21
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Proliferation Treaty (NPT), arguing that it did
not exempt peaceful nuclear explosions for
civil engineering and that it addressed nonproliferation rather than the more fundamental
question of nuclear disarmament. 23 It was
only in 1998 that Brazil signed the NPT as a
non-nuclear-weapon state under President
Fernando Henrique Cardoso. 24
SECURITY MODEL: ARMS RACE
AGAINST ARGENTINA?
History provides compelling
arguments favoring the security model as an
explanation for national nuclear quests.
Britain and France are seen to have built
nuclear weapons due to the growing Soviet
military threat. Also contributing to their
initiatives was reduction in credibility of the
U.S. nuclear guarantee to NATO allies, once
the Soviet Union was able to threaten
retaliation against the United States. China
developed the bomb because Beijing was
threatened with possible nuclear attack by the
United States at the end of the Korean War
and again during the Taiwan Strait crises in
the mid-1950s. After China developed the
bomb in 1964, India, which had just fought a
war with China in 1962, was bound to follow
suit and detonated what was called a
“Peaceful Nuclear Explosion” (PNE) in May
1974. After the Indian explosion, however,
the nascent Pakistani weapons program had to
move forward according to the security
dilemma: facing a recently hostile neighbor
with both nuclear weapons and conventional
military superiority, the government in

22

In the same year, Brazilian president Fernando Collor
de Melo finalized the “Parallel Program”, as an attempt
to reinsert Brazil in the international system.
23
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24
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Islamabad sought to produce a nuclear
weapon as quickly as possible. 25

environment during the period when the
country pursued nuclear capability.

Due to the enormous destructive power of a
nuclear device, any state that seeks to
maintain its national security must balance
against a rival state that develops nuclear
capacity by gaining access to a nuclear
deterrent itself. Strong states can adopt the
costly but self-sufficient policy of developing
their own nuclear weapons. Weak states can
join a balancing alliance with a nuclear
power, exploiting a promise of nuclear
retaliation by that ally as a means of extended
deterrence. For developing countries,
acquiring a nuclear ally may be the only
option available. 26

Brazil peacefully settled all of its unresolved
territorial disputes with neighboring countries
early in the twentieth century. As a result, for
over a hundred years the country has
considered itself “geopolitically satisfied,”
with state-building progressing through
diplomatic negotiation rather than
engagement in military disputes. 28

Karsten Frey has argued that, although
security-centered explanations have
deficiencies, it is reasonable to assume that
the desire for self-preservation figures
prominently in the preference system of any
state with regard to its nuclear choice. This
desire, however, is guided less by relative
power distribution than by security
perceptions that originate from nuclear
weapons’ symbolic stature as the ultimate
weapons and the embodiment of the human
fantasy of invulnerability. In other words,
from the viewpoint of the “proliferant,”
nuclear weapons figure as totems of power,
which increase the perception of security.
Notably, the motivation for doing so is the
actor’s abstract sentiment of fear, not
necessarily existing danger. 27 This concept is
critical when we assess the Brazilian security
25
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27
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(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).
28
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26

Interstate relations within South America
have been remarkably placid, to a degree
unmatched in most other regions of the world.
Regardless of enduring bilateral rivalries and
several militarized interstate crises, countries
in South America in general paradoxically
avoided large-scale, intra-regional war. In
two hundred years (1816-2016), they waged
four major wars in the nineteenth century, one
in the first half of the twentieth century, and
none since the end of the Chaco War between
Bolivia and Paraguay in 1935. 29
Miguel Angel Centeno attributes this relative
scarcity of international wars in Latin
America to the absence of a strong
centralizing state authority during a long
period of the region’s history. 30 Because
Latin American states developed so late, in
the late nineteenth century, there were simply
too many conflicts occurring within each state
for these countries to have much energy to
fight one another. Centeno argues that the
internal struggles, the never-resolved social
and economic divisions, and lastly, the inertia
Action, Choice and Responsibilities,” International
Affairs Vol. 82, No. 1 (Jan 2006): 21-40, p. 22.
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of peace “made it practically unimaginable to
break with the geopolitical status quo in Latin
America.” 31
The most troubling rivalry in South America
nevertheless pitted Argentina and Brazil.
Beginning before they achieved independence
from Spain and Portugal, the rivalry heated up
in the nineteenth century when Hispanic
nations opposed Brazil's attempts to maintain
a presence in the area of Rio de la Plata.
Countries engaged in repeated armed clashes,
the most important being the Cisplatine War
(1825-28) between Argentina and Brazil.
Even after most of the border conflicts were
settled, the rivalry between these countries
persisted. 32
By 1979, however, the two countries achieved
an important diplomatic rapprochement,
concluding the “Acordo Tripartite” among
Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina over the
construction of a hydroelectric dam on the
Paraná River located on the border between
Brazil and Paraguay. 33 The agreement
constituted a key factor in stabilizing relations
in the region and is considered the gold
standard with respect to international politics
and diplomacy. 34 After harmonization
between the most prominent actors of the
continent, regional integration continued
apace in South America: Brazil and Argentina
engaged in fruitful cooperation, and this
31
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35
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50

appeared to lay the foundation for South
American integration.
As early as 1967, civilian bureaucracies
engaged in nuclear research both in Argentina
and Brazil were already seeking “a direct
exchange of ideas between Brazilian and
Argentine technicians to establish broader
contact and cooperation between the two
countries in the field of nuclear energy.” 35
Beginning in 1976, Brazil bore the brunt of
American pressure to change its nuclear
program with the Federal Republic of
Germany. Remarkably, to balance the
pressure from Washington, Brazil found
support only from Argentina. 36 Collaboration
between the two countries on nuclear subjects
was reinforced from 1980 as a consequence of
signing cooperation agreements and by means
of diplomatic events such as the 1988 visit of
Argentine President Alfonsín to the isotopic
enrichment plant in Iperó.
In many cases, Buenos Aires and Brasilia
coordinated their policies concerning
international non-proliferation regimes. 37
Both governments decided to impose limits
on their respective nuclear programs and to
rewrite their doctrines of national security,
transforming the neighbor into a partner.
They created formal mechanisms for
generating mutual trust, as was the case of the
“cross-check,” method by which inspectors
Foreign Ministry, December 29, 1967, Possible
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Center.
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from a country evaluated nuclear facilities of
the other. 38
In 1983, Argentina achieved uranium
enrichment by gaseous diffusion. A letter
was sent from Argentine President Reynaldo
Bignone to notify Brazil of the achievement
before it was announced publicly. After
reiterating the full and steadfast adherence to
the policy of non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons, the letter described Argentina’s
achievement as having “important regional
projections, since it constituted a significant
step toward Latin American self-sufficiency
in a highly transcendental area.” 39
In his response, Brazilian President João
Figueiredo congratulated Argentina and stated
that the two countries “have already
developed excellent cooperation on nuclear
matters, and will continue to work in this
manner for mutual benefit and the economic
and social development of the entire Latin
American community.” 40 Appropriately,
President Sarney subsequently sent an
emissary to Argentina to inform President
Raúl Alfonsín in 1987 that Brazil had
obtained uranium enrichment technology.
The political gesture was much appreciated in
Buenos Aires. 41
38
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Even so, a contemporary report by the Central
Intelligence Agency of the United States
assumed that the announcement in late 1983
of Argentine enrichment capability greatly
spurred the Brazilians. 42 It argued that some
military officers believed that Buenos Aires
had built, or could build, nuclear weapons and
that Argentina posed a potential military
threat. In any case, the report also confirmed
that relations between the countries were
quite good.
If the two countries did not fully trust each
other due to some inherent wariness, Brazil
and Argentina were nevertheless positively
engaged in settling their antagonism and in
cooperating on nuclear issues. Their
collaboration in nuclear policies is perceived
by some scholars—along with the Itaipu Dam
agreement—as a hallmark of disjunction from
their traditional rivalry. 43
In effect, Brazil and Argentina shared the
view that nuclear capacity was a right of
every sovereign state. Both countries
perceived as a constraint great powers’
exclusivity and exceptionalism on nuclear
matters. During conversations between
presidents Alfonsín and Figueiredo to prepare
2013),
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a joint declaration on the renunciation of
nuclear explosives, there were clear efforts to
undermine any possible security dilemma or
arms race:
“I consider it of great importance for each of
our countries, for their bilateral relationship
and their image in front of the international
community in general, that both could
dissipate, in Latin America, in the USA and
Europe, any idea of rivalry or ulterior motives
in our respective nuclear programs, as well as
not creating an opening through which
someone could try to play us against one
another.” 44
Argentinians considered “of great importance
to maintain a relationship of cooperation and
confidence with Brazil in the area, due to the
benefits that this relationship could signify for
both countries in terms of resistance to the
nuclear regimes as envisioned by the great
powers.” 45 The belief that it was necessary to
avoid great powers’ constraints in nuclear
matters repeatedly echoed in Brazilian
declarations.
The joint action of Brasilia and Buenos Aires
was decisive in negotiations of the Treaty for
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), between 1964
and 1967. In 1968, both countries refused to
ratify the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) because they
considered it discriminatory. Coordinated
action of the two states in the international
system sought to keep open supply routes of
materials and nuclear technology and to
44
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legitimize their policies and projects in the
nuclear field. 46
In his seminal article, Sagan saw the Brazilian
case as a perfect illustration of the security
model. He judged that protracted rivalry
between the two major South American
countries motivated the search for nuclear
power as a pathway to nuclear weapons.
Sagan considered their refusal to complete the
necessary steps to join the Latin American
nuclear weapons-free zone as a consequence
of their rivalry. 47
Contrary to Sagan’s assumption in this case,
archival evidence attests that Brazil and
Argentina positively engaged in bilateral
cooperation on nuclear issues. They
understood that their best strategy was to stick
together against pressures of the nonproliferation regime, preserving their
autonomy vis-à-vis the international system. 48
Brazilian resistance to join the NWFZ
stemmed from its belief that the treaty should
only come into effect upon unanimous
adherence by Latin American nations, extraregional nations with territories in Latin
America, and the world’s nuclear powers.
From Brazil’s perspective, one rogue nation
could endanger Latin America’s very
existence. 49
Certainly, hawkish statements were also part
of the Brazilian discussions concerning the
development of nuclear capacity. In 1967,
during a session of the National Security
Council, the Minister of Industry and
Commerce stated: “to say that Brazil will not
47
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make arms with nuclear energy someday is an
illusion. It will not be in our days, we may
not wish it, but it may become an imperative
of national security.” 50 The statement is a
clear reference to the use of the nuclear
program to develop nuclear weapons. 51
But, as Matias Spektor accurately points out
in his research article, although some of the
ministers present at the gathering made
“references to the possibility that Brazil might
use nuclear power for national security
purposes as well,” this possibility was left
unspecified. It is also significant that there
was no mention of Argentina or any other
state as a threat against which Brazil might
have to guard itself. 52 Brazilian leadership
saw the nuclear program mainly as a method
to achieve autonomy, not deterrence.
In 1990, five years after democracy had been
reinstated in Brazil, a Joint Parliamentary
Committee of Inquiry was created to
investigate the “autonomous nuclear
program.” During one of the sessions, the
former minister of the Navy, Admiral
Maximiano da Fonseca, supported the
argument that the parallel program was kept
secret “not to hide from public opinion,” but
to protect the project and the Brazilian
government from the tremendous
international opposition. He cited several
examples of equipment sales and bans on
technology transfer in this area. For him, “the
major powers assume that only they,
exclusively they, have the right to produce
50
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4. In 2009, vice president and former minister of
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community.

nuclear artifacts.” He argued that United
States pressure was very strong: “Mainly
American. They lead all this. The (pressure)
of them is terrible. It was terrible at that
time.” 53
Although security explanations convey much
of the conventional wisdom about Brazil’s
nuclear program, the first presumption is that
its foremost objective was to build a nuclear
weapon aimed at balancing Argentinian
power. We cannot rule out this factor as a
contributor to the Brazilian enterprise, but it
was not its main objective, even when the
program changed to a secret character. For
example, no simultaneous development of a
nuclear delivery system—neither strategic
bombers nor a ballistic missile program—
accompanied the program. 54
Extensive documentation shows that the
Brazil-Argentina rivalry greatly decreased by
the time Brazil proceeded with its secret
nuclear program. Ultimately, the two
countries joined in diplomatic efforts to face
the pressure of international non-proliferation
policies. In reality, today, their nuclear
programs are considered a milestone in
bringing the two countries together toward a
stable, peaceful relationship.
DOMESTIC FACTORS INFLUENCING
BRAZIL’S DECISION
Whether or not the acquisition of
nuclear weapons serves the national interest
of a state, it is likely to serve parochial
51
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bureaucratic or political interests of at least
some individual actors within the state.
Sagan’s second model of nuclear proliferation
focused on domestic actors that encourage
governments to pursue a nuclear bomb.
Actors interested in the acquisition of nuclear
weapons commonly belong to the military,
the military-industrial complex, the nuclear
scientific establishment, and the political
class. Frequently, the common interest of
these actors leads to the formation of a
coalition, a “strategic elite,” which seeks
administrative as well as communicative
power. 55
Sagan posited that when such actors form
coalitions and are strong enough to control the
government's decision-making process—
either through their direct political power or
indirectly through their control of
information—nuclear weapons programs are
likely to thrive. Brazil’s first real strides in
the field occurred under the military regime
that ruled from 1964 to 1985. In 1967, the
government of General Artur da Costa e Silva
drew up a detailed plan for the full
development of nuclear energy and,
simultaneously, adopted a policy of firm
opposition to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) while concurring, albeit with
reservations, on the NWFZ in Latin
America. 56
Naturally, military roots had—and still
have—an overwhelming influence on Brazil’s
nuclear program. Brazil is the only nonnuclear-weapon state in which the military
leases uranium enrichment technology to the
civilian nuclear program. When the
autonomous program was created, all three
branches of the Brazilian military were
engaged in the nuclear effort.
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Moreover, the Navy's pursuit of uranium
enrichment was the most determined and
sustained effort of the entire parallel nuclear
program. The Navy’s nuclear-fuel-cycle
commitment was largely driven by its
ambition to build a nuclear-powered
submarine. They implemented the initial
stage of the fuel-cycle project at an
impressive speed, working out of Brazil’s
Nuclear Energy Research Institute (IPEN,
University of São Paulo). By 1981, the Navy
built two centrifuges for uranium enrichment,
and by 1984, it ran nine centrifuges at IPEN.
The Air Force and the Army’s projects
eventually fizzled, but the Navy's program
continued, unabated by changes in the
Brazilian political landscape after 1985. 57
Under civilian governments, the Navy
program persisted, and its survival was never
jeopardized, despite fluctuating funding
levels. In the early 1990s, Brazil’s second
civilian president after the dictatorship,
Fernando Collor de Mello, fully disclosed the
parallel nuclear program and publicly
condemned it. Notwithstanding stated
objections, his appointment of Admiral Mario
César Flores, one of the main supporters of
the submarine program, as the minister of the
Navy guaranteed enough funding for the
program to survive. 58
Whereas Brazil’s domestic political situation
and its regional environment underwent major
transformations, the Navy’s nuclear-fuelcycle and nuclear submarine projects
remained as constant elements of Brazil’s
nuclear landscape. This constancy was
possible because, even after the military
government transitioned out of power and the
first civilian president took office (1985), the
military retained significant authority, and
managed to withstand top-down political
pressures.
57
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Furthermore, the Navy’s aspiration to develop
a nuclear-powered submarine was well
established. In 1967, during the National
Security Council meeting that discussed the
guidelines for Brazilian nuclear policy in
President Costa e Silva’s government (19671969), the minister of the Navy emphasized
the importance of nuclear energy since it
could be used to propel a nuclear vessel. He
stressed that the “Navy has been dealing with
the question of nuclear energy because it
considers that indispensable.” 59
Scott Sagan correctly pointed out that the
Brazilian Nuclear program served interests of
the atomic industry bureaucrats and the
military. 60 However, contrary to what Sagan
asserted, the military, in fact, managed to
maintain the program despite new civilian
regimes. The role of the military services,
particularly of the Brazilian Navy, was
fundamental to the nuclear program.
Although construction of a nuclear bomb was
not a primary goal for Brazil, the military
understood (and expressed) that, once nuclear
capacity was achieved, only “a political
decision” would be necessary to develop
nuclear weapons. 61
THE NORMS MODEL: NATIONAL
IDENTITY AS THE MOST IMPORTANT
FACTOR
“It is necessary that Brazil make it clear to the
United States and the world the difference
between antagonizing confrontation and
confrontation for autonomy. The type of
world that Brazil wants is multipolar, in
59
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which the South American system will have
autonomy vis-à-vis the American system.” 62
Helio Jaguaribe, Brazilian sociologist,
political scientist, and writer
Sagan’s third model focuses on norms
concerning nuclear capacity, seeing nuclear
decisions as serving important symbolic
functions—both shaping and reflecting a
state's identity. According to this perspective,
state behavior is determined not by leaders’
cold calculations about national security
interests or their parochial bureaucratic
benefits, but rather by deeper norms and
shared beliefs about what actions a state
understands as legitimate and appropriate in
international relations.
Helio Jaguaribe’s quote opening this section
is one among countless declarations that
reflects the paramount significance a
particular image has to Brazilian intellectuals,
military officers, political leaders, and in fact
to all Brazilian society: the concept of an
autonomous state. Brazilian political scientist
José Flávio Saraiva Sobrinho
comprehensively traced the concept of
autonomy in Brazil’s foreign policy since the
country’s independence from Portugal in
1822. 63 In certain historical periods, like the
early 1960s, the concept of decision
autonomy became jargon in Brazilian foreign
policy. The idea penetrated various social
and political layers in society, from the
cabinets in parliament to the streets. It
appeared in the vaunted “Independent Foreign
Policy,” which marked the governments of
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presidents Jânio Quadros and João Goulart
(1961-1964). 64
Interestingly, when Saraiva provided an
example to illustrate the importance of
autonomy to Brazil, he cited Admiral Álvaro
Alberto Mota e Silva, who represented the
country at the United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission in 1947 and delineated the first
proposal to establish a Brazilian nuclear
program. According to Saraiva, Mota e Silva
asserted Brazilian nuclear potential as a way
to achieve autonomous scientific national
progress.
Decision autonomy, ingrained in the “nature”
of the country, did not change throughout
democratic or authoritarian regimes.
Appreciating the importance of this concept
to the Brazilian nation is central to
understanding that a key concern for the
Brazilian military was possible interference of
the major powers in Brazilian foreign policy.
Constraints would be exerted, the argument
goes, by controlling technological flows and
armament transfers for the country. The
concern boosted Brazilian determination to
establish a national military industry. From
the 1970s, Brazil’s fixation on national
autonomy supported efforts of nationalization
for projects and components that would
integrate supplies to the three services. 65 In
the 1980s, Brazil addressed this aspect as not
just a hypothesis, but a real factor emerging
out of foreign pressure.
Autonomy as an element of Brazilian identity
permeated numerous documents, meetings,
and speeches concerning Brazil’s nuclear
program. It was present from the proposal to
establish a nuclear endeavor in 1947, to the
nationalistic speech announcing the success of
64
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independent uranium enrichment by President
José Sarney in 1987. In his speech, Sarney
lamented the difficulties and restrictions
imposed by foreign states. He reaffirmed the
“determined purpose of acquiring broad and
unhindered access to the full extent of
scientific knowledge and its practical
applications.” 66
Karsten Frey argued that receptivity towards
nuclear capacity is closely related to the idea
of international prestige. A strong sense of
sovereignty and the search for the “right place
at the table” in the international arena is often
translated into a pronounced sense of national
prestige and status. States aim at status
through the display of power, usually to
increase it. 67
Prestige, however, was not Brazil’s foremost
motivation in its search for nuclear capacity.
Brazil’s desire to influence international rules
and regimes is better assessed under the
concept of autonomy. A secret report of the
General Secretariat of the National Security
Council to the Brazilian President, wherein
development of the “autonomous program”
was discussed, illustrates this assertion:
“The right to use nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes, to support our technological
independence and as a perspective of progress
for all of Latin America, constitutes a basic
foundation of the National Nuclear Energy
Policy.” 68
The report decried U.S. sanctions to the
program that created “all sorts of obstacles,
first of a technical nature and subsequently
presenting overt political motives, with
repercussions in the economic field.” 69
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Brazil was indeed eager to establish itself as
independent and self-sufficient in the nuclear
realm. 70 The demands for its rightful “place
at the table,” a persistent Brazilian phrasing,
in the case of nuclear development related to
autonomy rather than prestige. The premise
of Brazil’s stance on the global nuclear order
was that the order itself was unfair, that it
benefited nuclear-weapon states, and that it
put undue pressure on countries that did not
possess nuclear weapons. Nuclear justice and
the fight against “double standards” were at
the heart of Brazilian beliefs and nuclear
rhetoric. 71
When we assess the Brazilian nuclear
program, oriented toward the fundamental
importance of autonomy for Brazilian
identity, we understand how the program
managed to progress despite international
sanctions, economic difficulties, a radical
change in the political regime, and the
expected technical challenges. Nuclear
capacity reified achievement of autonomy,
and autonomy was profoundly etched in
Brazilian politics.
The military initiated the autonomous
program when they were ruling the country.
Nonetheless, security concerns were only
contributing factors to the development of the
nuclear enterprise. The military, particularly
the Navy, embraced emotional and
nationalistic conceptions of autonomy and
carried these as a flag, defended in the same
way that the military conceives any given
assignment: as a “mission” on behalf of the
nation.
CONCLUSION
This article has argued against the
commonly held assumption that Brazil
developed a secret nuclear program to balance
against Argentina, a long-time opponent.
70
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When the country made its first nuclear steps,
Brazil saw nuclear capacity as an alternative
means for energy generation, and as an
ambitious endeavor that would bring
international prestige. After setbacks caused
by pressures of the United States and
international nuclear regimes, the country
determinedly latched onto the project as if it
represented the national flag. Ultimately,
Brazil’s autonomous nuclear program was a
mechanism of resistance against the
international system, seen as discriminatory
and designed to restrict the country’s
inalienable right to noninterference in its
internal affairs.
Despite the rivalry of Brazil and Argentina,
their respective programs for developing
nuclear capacity ultimately became the
cornerstone for extensive cooperation
between the South American powers. Brazil
and Argentina articulated together their
approaches to international regimes and
responses to systemic pressures against their
programs. Their nuclear organizations
engaged in some degree of cooperation and
this new dynamic of collaboration decidedly
transformed South America as a whole,
opening the way for freer trade and
consolidation of democratic regimes.
Certainly, military control of the nuclear
program greatly contributed to the resilience
of the project. The autonomous program was
initiated when the military governed the state,
and the Navy vigorously protected its service
interest in nuclear developments in order to
implement a nuclear-powered submarine.
However, once the military regime had been
voted out in 1985, the democratic government
did not undercut the program. When
announcing that Brazil finally mastered the
uranium enrichment cycle, the first civilian
president after the dictatorship praised the fact
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as an enormous achievement in the scientific
history of the country.
Brazilian diplomatic initiatives habitually
express the desire to forge a uniquely
Brazilian way in becoming a global player.
This compelling belief influenced many of the
country’s subsequent nuclear decisions. Fiery
reactions came in response to constraints
imposed by American nonproliferation
sanctions that were perceived as aggression
against “the right to utilize nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes, as a primary factor of
national development.” 72 The sanctions—and
it should be stressed they were not applied
exclusively to Brazil—were taken as a
restraint hampering Brazilian autonomy,
which was a natural right strongly intertwined
with the country’s identity. The removal of
impositions and perceived offenses by the
United States almost certainly would have
minimized the problem of strong emotional
response—either humiliation or pride—and
would likely have minimized the sense of
“mission” that the Brazilian military
ultimately embraced.
This archival research demonstrates how
domestic and normative factors were decisive
in sustaining Brazil’s pursuit of nuclear
capacity. The importance of autonomy to
Brazilian identity can be observed in
numerous reports and speeches. More
recently, the Brazilian government issued an
announcement stating that its first nuclearpowered attack submarine would start
operations by 2021. 73 When inaugurating the
facilities of the nuclear submarine, President
Dilma Rousseff emphasized “the importance
72
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and pride we feel when we look there and see
written, ‘Made in Brazil’. The local content,
the domestic content of what is produced
here, shows the strength of the Brazilian
capacity.” 74
Despite technological difficulties, pressures
from the international nuclear regime, and a
domestic change from military to democratic
government, strong and commonly held
values on Brazilian autonomy led the country
to press forward its nuclear program. The
main fuel boosting Brazil’s determination to
attain nuclear power was ingrained national
fixation on autonomy.
This study should inspire further research on
the motivations and purposes of nuclear
programs that run against long-term goals of
the widely subscribed Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Today, the
world witnesses resurgent and assertive
nuclear programs across several regions.
North Korea, for example, despite strong
pressures from the international community
and halts in testing, continues to hold onto its
nuclear reactors and weapons labs.
If the primary motivation for North Korea’s
program were purely to increase national
security against an external rival like South
Korea in alliance with the United States, then
various initiatives of goodwill should have led
to abandonment of Pyongyang’s nuclear
weapon ambitions. So far, they have not.
In 2018, United States President Donald
Trump declared that a Nuclear Deal with
North Korea “would take years,” a shift from
UFEM” (speech, Itaguaí, RJ, March 01, 2013), Casa
Civil da Presidência da República do Brasil,
http://www2.planalto.gov.br/acompanhe-oplanalto/discursos/discursos-da-presidenta/discurso-dapresidenta-da-republica-dilma-rousseff-na-cerimoniade-inauguracao-da-unidade-de-fabricacao-deestruturas-metalicas-2013-ufem-itaguai-rj.
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his 2017 posture which demanded,
“Pyongyang has to disarm rapidly.” 75 What
other reasons may be contributing to—or
determining—the resilience of North Korea’s

75

David Sanger, “North Korea Nuclear Deal Could
Take ‘Years’, Trump Suggests,” The New York Times,
September 26, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/world/asia/trump
-korea-nuclear-deal.html.

program? The Brazilian case indicates that
the explanation for North Korea’s longstanding nuclear program may not rest solely
on security concerns.

Article

Arms Control and Deterrence in the Age of Cross-Domain Coercion
Damon Coletta
For deterrence, now, first seek arms control.

The old relationship linking
deterrence, defense, and arms control served
U.S. policy makers for decades during the
Cold War. 1 It was manifest through the Spirit
of Geneva (1955) and the Reykjavik Summit
(1986). Much later, during the rise of crossdomain coercion and following Russia’s
annexation of Crimea, the same idea
reemerged in NATO’s Warsaw Communique
(2016). 2
In each case, strategic deterrence came first,
ahead of credible conventional defense, and
neither deterrence nor defense were to be in
doubt before entering into arms control.
President Ronald Reagan captured the core
principle during ultimately successful
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty ratification debates, toward the end of
the superpower rivalry, when the ambition of
arms control proposals was climbing: “trust
but verify.” Verification would work, back
then, and arms control would endure, if the
United States were negotiating from strength.

the Middle East, the old principle was fraying,
showing its insufficiency. Even before the
Warsaw Communique, adversaries found
ways to work around U.S. material superiority
in conventional defense or strategic
deterrence, using cross-domain attacks to alter
positions on the geopolitical chessboard
without drawing a massive U.S. response.
Unlike the situation during the Cold War,
deterring aggression below the nuclear
threshold in the age of cross-domain coercion
will more likely be accomplished by first
creating more reasons to maintain cooperation
with rising regional powers, reasons including
technological benefits and strategic stability
attainable through 21st century arms control.

By the time of Russia’s hybrid war in Ukraine
and other events compromising American
interests in Europe, the South China Sea, and

Inability during the 20th century to close the
case that deterrence and defense were assured
handicapped the original bid for a grand
bargain, the Baruch Plan for international
control of nuclear arms after World War II.
More recently, and less understandably, it
undercut hopes that arms control in the form
of cooperation on regional missile defense
aimed at rogue actors could cement a new
U.S.-Russian strategic partnership after 9/11. 3
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Goodby (2006); Mandelbaum and Talbot (1986/87);
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a sample of the large literature on deterrence, defense,
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The text of NSC 68, “Report to the National Security
Council,” April 12, 1950 has been uploaded by the
Truman Presidential Library
(https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_coll
ections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf); see the
section on “International Control of Atomic Energy,”
pp. 40-43. Goodby and Morel (1993); Stent (2015).
Censoring assumptions were applied to analysis of
nuclear policy during the Cold War in Pelopidas
(2016). Jennet Conant (2017) recounted how such
premises, what would become standard postulates of
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This latter invocation of an iron law requiring
more deterrence before arms control proved
particularly frustrating. So many of the
world’s contemporary security challenges—
expansion of Chinese economic and military
influence in the South China Sea; terrorist
threats emanating from the Middle East;
demand for reciprocal restraint in the face of
climate change; increasing competition in
space; and rising likelihood of states like
North Korea and Iran trafficking in nuclear
weapons—are amenable to U.S.-Russia
cooperation. Yet, any attempt at resetting the
relationship between the two largest nuclear
powers is held hostage by a new breed of
extended crises featuring cross-domain
coercion. NATO remains anxious about local
strength of its conventional defenses and the
reliability of American extended deterrence
when violence and ceasefire violations occur
in Ukraine. 4 Russia feels insecure as NATO
holds its door open for future accession by
Georgia and Ukraine, as the United States and
Russia both intervene in Syria, and as the
United States spends billions on new
interceptors for European missile defense and
ground-based national defense. 5
According to the Cold War principle, arms
control always came last: no progress was
possible without adequate preconditions for
deterrence and defense. This axiom became a
motor for dynamic tension and relaxation,
crisis and détente. Today, in the age of hybrid
war, without the immediacy of a nuclear
showdown, common understanding of the
deterrence, stifled the Baruch Plan in Man of the Hour:
James B. Conant, Warrior Scientist, pp. 368-372.
4
Adamsky (2018, pp. 164-168).
5
NATO’s Warsaw Communique trumpeted progress
on deploying American-organized missile defense sites
in Europe (paragraph 57).
6
NATO, Strategic Concept: Active Engagement,
Modern Defense, November 19, 2010, available at
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_82705.htm;
White House, National Security Strategy of the United
States of America, December 2017, available at

proper relation between deterrence and arms
control is obsolete; it mires protagonists in
unproductive, ultimately dangerous, paralysis.
Today, instrumental arms control, the kind
that promotes coordination of defense
postures toward strategic stability, rather
ought to come first because it can set the stage
for successful deterrence.
STRENGTHENING DETERRENCE
NOW
To appreciate why the shift has
occurred, including an abrupt change in the
U.S. problem set from escalation management
to frozen conflict between nuclear powers, it
is helpful to turn attention toward the
censoring assumptions underlying deterrence
policy. Notably, the scientific-analytical
definition of deterrence is not identical to the
operational one used in defense policy
guidance such as NATO’s Strategic Concept,
the U.S. National Security Strategy, or U.S.
Air Force doctrine. 6 In all these instances, the
doctrine is to win, to dominate, to control the
adversary when necessary. Reflecting this
optimistic policy guidance, operational
deterrence is thought to have succeeded in the
Cold War by threat of counteraction,
preventing the Soviet Union from crossing the
inner-Berlin border or exploiting the Fulda
Gap in West Germany. 7 In this most crucial
case, deterrence worked because the
adversary was persuaded that costs of action
would outweigh benefits. 8

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-09052.pdf; United States Air Force, Volume III: Command,
Annex 3-72 Nuclear Operations, available at
https://www.doctrine.af.mil/dnv1vol3.htm.
7
Mearsheimer (1983).
8
This same maxim underpins a vast literature on 21st
century deterrence, e.g., deterrence after the Cold War
and deterrence after 9-11. Gray (2000); Payne (2001);
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Given this positive framing, it is not
surprising that deterrence as policy receives
favorable mention in the U.S. National
Security Strategy. Enormous military budgets
are justified, though few forces are engaged,
because an extensive posture is necessary to
deter calamities across a variety of conflict
domains at points around the globe. The
military stands prepared to prevent attacks on
the homeland, on allies in Europe or Asia,
against soft targets in Iraq and Syria, on the
seas, in space, or across cyber. When
deterrence fails, the appropriate mix of
nuclear, conventional, and special operations
forces, in coordination with tools from the
whole of government and coalition
governments, must defeat whichever
aggressors in aforesaid domains. Defense
capability under deterrence as panacea is
always badly needed. More is better since
more forces buttress the deterrent: its
capability, its communication to adversaries,
and, most controversially, its credibility. 9
Credibility is in the crosshairs, again today,
because it is the one requirement that can
soak up much of the presumed benefit of
deterrence policy as an alternative to fighting.
Deterrence, after all, should spare lives and
treasure. It protects national interests by
keeping opponents at bay without having to
strike a mortal blow or slog through a wasting
war of attrition. This was the hopeful premise
underlying President Eisenhower’s New
Look: modest investment in nuclear weapons,
for brandishing not launch, could contain
Soviet aggression after costly conventional
stalemates in Korea and Berlin, without
having to match every Red Army division left
Wirtz (2009); Delpech (2012); Lowther (2012). It also
matches USAF Annex 3-72.
9
Payne (2016). Neither does more capability
necessarily provoke a destabilizing reaction from the
other side. Cunningham and Fravel (2015). In tension
with this argument, though, see Haynes (2016).
10
Goodby (2006, Ch. 2); Bowie and Immerman
(1998). Recent research shows that Eisenhower’s
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in Europe or Communist-inspired insurgency
in the developing world.
For such a threat to give adversaries pause,
however, they had to believe that the United
States would carry out the punishment once
red lines were violated. While few may have
doubted Eisenhower’s resolve when the
United States enjoyed superiority in nuclear
capable bombers, by the end of his
administration defense policy advisers were
urging the President to expand defense
spending in order to prevent the Soviets from
acquiring overwhelming superiority in the
balance of strategic forces. 10 While the actual
budget increase would have to abide a new
administration and a change of party in the
White House, the core issue was clear enough
to friend and foe: faced with naked Soviet
aggression in Europe, Asia, or the Middle
East, would an American president sacrifice
New York to save Paris or any other allied
city? Once both Cold War superpowers
possessed hundreds, eventually thousands, of
nuclear weapons, deterrence became a mutual
affair. The United States could not launch a
“disarming strike” without running the grave
risk that the Soviets would survive long
enough to launch a devastating salvo of their
own. 11
During contemporary crises that cut across
multiple domains of conflict, it appears that
the United States and rising regional powers
are still mutually deterred from engaging their
most terrible weapons. Old school deterrence
continues to function at the major
conventional and nuclear levels, and yet, 21st
century hybrid wars and cross-domain
advisers may have been prescient. “[S]tates that enjoy
nuclear superiority over their opponents are more likely
to win” (Kroenig 2013, 141).
11
Lieber and Press (2006) shocked the community by
suggesting deviation from Cold War restraint: an
attempt by the United States to break out from mutual
deterrence and achieve nuclear primacy that could be
used for coercion or “compellence.”
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gambits are multiplying not receding.
Successful deterrence in the age of crossdomain coercion must demand a logic of state
behavior that is missing from classic Cold
War theories. 12
TWO TRADITIONS OF NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE
American economist Thomas
Schelling articulated the dilemma best in his
seminal Arms and Influence (1966).
Published when the nuclear arms race was
well underway, Schelling’s book aspired to
reach a broad audience, pointing out how
straightforward logic underlying complex
national security decisions of maximum
gravity followed the rules of familiar games
accessible to any educated citizen. Part of the
greatness of Arms & Influence—Schelling
shared the 2005 Nobel Prize for his career
contributions—was in how it democratized
deterrence and defense. It supplied a lingua
franca for policy makers to explain growing
defense requests and alarming foreign policy
crises to the American people, which in turn
allowed presidents to lay planks of public
support for Cold War policy, and to be held
accountable when strategy failed to perform. 13
As it turned out, policy did not follow
Schelling’s model or recommendations
entirely. In his most resonant scenarios,
Schelling emphasized risk and ambiguity over
obvious brawn. When two contenders were
playing chicken, approaching the precipice,
tied at the waist, it did not matter after a
certain point whether one was bigger or
12

An alternate “domain” of low intensity conflict did
challenge U.S. interests during the Cold War. The
recent expansion of cross-domain options makes using
nuclear weapons in response for coercive diplomacy
much harder than it was against Soviet-backed
insurgencies. Geopolitical stakes are sliced even
thinner under cross-domain coercion, and challengers
today conceive activities below a conventional redline
that generally lies well below the nuclear threshold:

physically stronger. When either jumped into
the abyss, the other must follow. Schelling
likened increasing risk of nuclear war to loose
gravel at the edge of oblivion. 14 At the final
stages of the deterrence game, factors (loose
gravel) outside the control of either party
would determine when everyone went over
the cliff—unless, that is, one side conceded
first and dropped out of the game.
Winning the game, as long as things did not
spin out of control, depended upon conveying
resolve, a willingness to stay in and keep
inching closer to the edge. Later, when
resolve was quantified for formal models, it
had to be incorporated into expressions of
“expected utility” that could guide players’
calculations of whether to escalate or
capitulate. The infinite cost of general
nuclear war, oblivion in Schelling’s metaphor,
could not be included as a factor for the finite
value of game outcomes. Once the cost of
nuclear war was countable and made suitable
for the war ledger, this opened the door for
deterrence strategies quite divergent from the
New Look and from what Schelling explained
in Arms & Influence.
During the years of rapid expansion for both
U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals, Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara was famously
asked to quantify assured destruction required
for successful deterrence at the strategic level.
What percentage of industrial capacity and
what percentage of the population would have
to be placed at risk in order to dissuade the
Kremlin from crossing American red lines

like the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria, if they
fail to stay below the radar, challengers are likely to
cede ground once U.S.-level conventional units are
engaged. For complications in leveraging nuclear
weapons, even during the Cold War, see Sechser and
Fuhrmann (2017).
13
Dodge (2012).
14
Schelling (2008 c1966, 99).
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and attacking U.S. vital interests? 15
Regardless of McNamara’s answer, did there
not have to be conditions under which the
Soviets would accept very high risk of such
well-described, circumscribed destruction?
Indeed, this was the basis of strategic
stability: the Soviet Union would drive a crisis
over the cliff in order to hold onto its satellite
states in Eastern Europe. For both sides,
some geopolitical defeats had to be worse
than absorbing a nuclear assault.
Rather than relying on ambiguity, wondering
whether the dark shadow cast by thousands of
ballistic missiles would deter political
aggression, Americans and their European
allies debated a purported second school of
deterrence, touting the merits of flexible
response and escalation dominance. 16 Would
it not be safer, more logical, if anticipated
Soviet thrusts below the nuclear threshold
could be met in somewhat proportional,
symmetric fashion? Reducing rather than
generating ambiguity was the key to
communication. The adversary would know
that any step toward the precipice would bring
a strong counter-reaction, and any subsequent
move to raise the stakes would be similarly
cut off. The old deterrence posture in Arms
and Influence invited players to enter a
contest, to achieve geopolitical gains by
accepting increasing risk of mutual disaster.
By contrast, the new and improved flexible
deterrent would make it clear that nothing
could be gained before the first step was taken
toward a “competition in risk taking.” 17
Flexible response or escalation control did
provide a certain catharsis for American
policy makers, supplying the rationale for
burgeoning defense budgets in the 1960s and
during the late-Carter and Reagan
15

Robert McNamara, “Mutual Deterrence Speech,”
San Francisco, CA, September 18, 1967, available at
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/Deterr
ence.shtml <<October 20, 2016>>.
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presidencies. Robust spending—call it
deterrence capitalization—translated into a
wide array of options that allowed national
security officials to feel as if they gained a
measure of control; they could now (without
embracing Armageddon) adjust the price
when the Soviets sought to draw the more
powerful United States into Schelling’s crude,
leveling game of nuclear chicken. Yet,
especially after disillusionment in Vietnam,
critics of the second deterrence school did not
forget how prescient Eisenhower had been in
his 1961 Farewell Address when he warned
against America’s military-industrial
complex. 18
Expanded defense budgets undermined
important justifications for flexible response,
driving deficit spending, stoking inflation, and
straining the relationship between the defense
establishment and liberal society. 19
Withdrawal from Southeast Asia, temporary
softness in the budget, and rising concern
over a hollow American Army exacerbated
the challenge of maintaining flexible response
and encouraged countercyclical investment in
nuclear variety: multiple independently
targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) at the
strategic level; forward deployed short- and
intermediate-range nuclear-tipped missiles;
radiation enhanced (“neutron”) bombs;
nuclear cruise missiles (ALCMs and
GLCMs); guidance improvements for
submarine launched missiles (SLBMs); and
mobile land-based (MX) missiles. The scope,
magnitude, and relentlessness of nuclear
modernization, on both sides of the Cold War,
divided national security experts.
Toward the end of the 1970s, a faction from
civilian science steeped in the tradition of the
Manhattan Project, which beat Germany to
16
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the first fission bomb, and the Atomic Energy
Commission, which oversaw design,
manufacture, and stockpiling of the nation’s
nuclear arsenal, teamed with arms control
advocates linked to the State Department. 20
They resisted the military-industrial
juggernaut as consuming inordinate resources
while lowering the barrier to general nuclear
exchange. The elaborate posture required by
flexible deterrence could move the
superpowers closer to danger, chipping away
at common knowledge of a condition of
mutual assured destruction (MAD) and
nudging the parties toward serious
consideration, indeed incipient enthusiasm,
for nuclear utilization strategies (NUTS). 21
Prospects for nuclear utilization under the
flexible-control school of deterrence
prompted a host of concerns. Within what
Lawrence Freedman later termed the second
wave of deterrence research, scholars of
public policy and government pointed out
how dangerous escalating to deescalate
appeared from the case studies. The
quickening pace of countermoves and rising
levels of stress in a crisis raised the likelihood
as well for fatal misperception. 22 As the
sinews of flexible response were built,
deployed, and exercised, executive
bureaucracy had to keep pace. This
expansion brought new difficulties for
maintaining control, particularly during a
crisis, raising the specters of inadvertent
escalation, unauthorized use, and accidental
launch. 23

20

As a short list of relevant organizations, consider
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists; Arms Control
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of Concerned Scientists; Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs (Harvard Kennedy School); and
Stanford’s Center for International Security and Arms

ARMS CONTROL: FROM OFFENSIVE
LIMITS TO MISSILE DEFENSE AND
DISARMAMENT
By the time President Reagan came to
office, certainly after the first Congressional
session, enthusiasm for flexible response and
nuclear utilization was fading. The President
did support the B-1 supersonic and B-2 stealth
bomber programs, the MIRVed MX missile,
and intermediate-range Pershing II
deployment in Europe, and yes, politically,
this appeared to be a one hundred eighty
degree turn from Jimmy Carter’s program
cancellations toward the end of his
presidency. Yet, this reinvigorated nuclear
portfolio ignited bitter ideological divisions in
Congress and helped generate pressure for
renewed negotiations with the Soviet Union
that would bring progress on arms control. 24
Since Robert McNamara’s time in the Lyndon
Johnson administration, America’s
commitment to flexible response, its
determination to deter by brandishing an array
of limited attack options, ranging across the
anticipated ladder of escalation with the
Soviet Union, shaped its approach to arms
control. The Limited Test Ban and Hotline
agreements of 1963 addressed immediate
dangers of deploying nuclear weapons, which
would have plagued governments even if they
had stuck with Eisenhower’s logic and
modest strategic deterrent. Almost as soon as
these issues had been concluded, however, the
arms race began in earnest, and American
attention turned toward institutionalizing
ceilings on offensive weapons, modulating
Soviet aggressiveness in part by engaging
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21
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24
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them as sovereign equals in strategic arms
limitation (SALT) talks.
Eventual limits endorsed in SALT I and
SALT II were famously nonrestrictive; they
accommodated nuclear build programs
already in train so that treaties codified
armament rather than turning swords into
plowshares. Strategic stability under this fullfledged arms control regime, which from
1968-1986 endured somewhat longer than
most State or Defense Department political
careers, rested on mutual vulnerability to the
adversary’s secure offense. Welcoming safe
and secure ballistic missiles and long-range
bombers, in the other side’s offensive posture,
implied that effective missile defenses were
destabilizing. Accordingly, a crown jewel of
1970s arms control was the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty, negotiated in
conjunction with SALT. 25 In this case, an
expensive system that actually might have
been built, or experimented with, was
prohibited by international legal agreement.
Though the ABM Treaty as a straightforward
ban read concise and elegant compared to the
arcane counting rules for launchers and later
warheads that bloated SALT, ABM would
nevertheless lose its luster within a decade.
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defense, and arms control seemed to provide
an open invitation for Moscow to play and
win at the deadliest of games. Even if the
United States could occasionally, as in the
1973 Yom Kippur War, muster the resolve to
maintain its position, how long before this
strategic Russian roulette ended in catastrophe
for both sides? 26
It was this situation that Ronald Reagan,
criticized by contemporaries as ignorant and
cavalier but now acknowledged to have
thought deeply on nuclear weapons, sought to
change. Opponents from the left and some
centrist Republicans saw Reagan’s rejection
of SALT, accompanied by rhetoric promising
victory in the Cold War, as an abrupt, populist
attack on strategic stability, all that had been
painstakingly constructed since 1968. Once
superpower summitry rekindled, however,
and Reagan received a dynamic interlocutor
in new Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, it
became clear that the American President did
not seek a nuclear victory as much as a
different vision—renegotiated terms of
coexistence with the Soviet Union that would
redefine the relationships between deterrence,
defense, and arms control.

Money spared in missile defense during the
1970s poured into developing more secure
and accurate offense. The geopolitical and
ideological competition continued as well,
with crises in Southeast Asia, Angola, Cuba,
Nicaragua, and Afghanistan undermining
détente and U.S. defense in the Cold War. By
1982, the fine architecture of flexible
deterrence, escalation dominance, strategic
containment, and arms control tottered on a
foundation of sand. Rather than containing
the Soviets until their system could collapse
from its own internal contradictions, the U.S.
combination of deterrence, conventional

At the strategic level, Reagan as early as the
summer of 1982 proposed dramatic
reductions rather than mere limitations in
strategic weapons. 27 These proposals were
criticized by the Soviet Union as highly
asymmetric, but Strategic Arms Reduction
(START) talks continued. 28 At the same
time, Reagan approved the dual-track
strategy that combined arms control
negotiations with deployment of highly
accurate Pershing II intermediate-range
missiles in Europe. Ambassador Paul Nitze,
author of NSC-68 (1950), which formally
persuaded President Truman to build the
“super,” the hydrogen bomb, most likely had
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President Reagan’s true sentiments in mind
when, some thirty years later, the same Nitze
demonstrated American willingness to forego
the Pershing II in his famous “Walk in the
Woods” outside Geneva with his Soviet
counterpart. 29
A number of years and some difficult
moments in U.S.-Soviet relations passed, but
in Reagan’s second term, with Gorbachev in
charge at the Kremlin, pivotal innovations in
defense and arms control gained traction. By
the time Reagan and Gorbachev met at the
Reykjavik Summit in October 1986, the talks
included proposals to eliminate land-based
ICBMs, and there were parallel efforts afoot
to ban ground-launched ballistic and cruise
missiles of so-called intermediate range (5005500 km). 30 While the Reykjavik gambit
failed, both arms control initiatives
represented a watershed in deterrence. No
longer were great powers in the realm of
symmetric or flexible response to every
variety of militarized threat. True, airlaunched and submarine-based missiles
remained, but elimination of strategic,
ground-based weapons was proposed on the
American side as a stage toward a long-term
vision in which nuclear missiles (and
bombers) were rendered “impotent and
obsolete.” 31 Moreover, defense now meant
more than preparations to raise costs for the
author of a conventional invasion; it also
comprised mercurial interceptors of some sort
to sow doubt in the attacker’s mind about the
efficiency of his strategic nuclear force.
Even in the most elaborate and flexible of
deterrence postures from before, there was a
strategic umbrella at the end of every crisis
29
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training,
“Paul Nitze and A Walk in the Woods – A Failed
Attempt at Arms Control,” ADST (c1998-2016),
http://adst.org/2016/03/paul-nitze-and-a-walk-in-thewoods-a-failed-attempt-at-arms-control/ <<October 20,
2016>>.

escalation. Getting rid of this top cover
through arms elimination and missile defense
broke faith with both founding schools of
deterrence. If the Reagan vision unveiled to
the National Security establishment after 1986
came to pass, the United States and the Soviet
Union would fold their strategic umbrella and
abandon the protection of deterrence as
understood since Bernard Brodie’s classic,
The Absolute Weapon (1946).
THE END OF CREDIBILITY AND A
NEW CRISIS MODEL FOR STATE
BEHAVIOR
The Cold War ended too soon for
Reagan’s new direction to take effect. Had
Reagan fulfilled his dream, the strategic
renaissance would have been far more
profound than a simple return to Eisenhowerera ambiguity and contemplation of massive
retaliation. Eliminating via international arms
control all the forces capable of a doomsday
nuclear strike would have upended the
scientific-analytical concept articulated in
qualitative terms by early deterrence theorists
like Brodie, Schelling, and Snyder, and
subsequently quantified in formal games by
Robert Powell in his Nuclear Deterrence
Theory (1990).
Powell’s scholarship, coming out as the
Reagan administration and the Cold War were
drawing to a close, is especially relevant,
here, because its purpose was to encapsulate
deterrence as an analytical concept, to find
underlying unity among and reveal the
calculus behind deterrence policy
arguments. 32 Powell’s “stage game,” the
decision element within a larger conflict
30
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sequence, distilled the options facing heads of
government during a nuclear crisis: a)
concede the stake and drop out of the game;
b) escalate to the next stage while raising the
probability of all-out nuclear war; and c)
launch the first attack. 33
Powell’s game looked and played much like
Schelling’s competition in risk taking with
important exceptions. For example, in the
deterrence game, even the brinkmanship
version in which there was no limited attack
option (just accumulation of probability
toward all-out war), “the state with the
greatest resolve [might] not prevail” because
a “weakly committed” player still had
incentive, at least early on, to act tough, to try
to convince an adversary to back away from a
mutually costly contest. 34
Similarly, the limited retaliation game (an
idealized scenario in which the chance of
losing control was taken off the table) showed
how advantages of possessing calibrated
instruments to punish the adversary without
total destruction were counterbalanced: the
likelihood of nuclear crises declined with
flexible tools at the ready, but crises that did
occur ran longer and cost more. 35 Together,
the brinkmanship and flexible response
variants of deterrence encapsulated much of
the social science underlying the American
nuclear debate and the seesaw politics of how
to posture strategic, tactical nuclear, and
conventional arms to contain Soviet
aggression. 36
Properly understood, the Reagan revolution
upset the ordered relationship among
deterrence, defense, and arms control. Taking
away the option of general nuclear attack and
guaranteeing its elimination through missile
defense would break Powell’s working
33

Ibid., 39, 160.
Ibid., 77.
35
Ibid., 179.
34

68

model. With all out “nuclear attack” off the
table, crisis actors are left with two choices—
and only in the limited retaliation variant
since there can be no brinkmanship without
an effective nuclear arsenal. Actors submit or
continue to throw (and absorb) costly-butlimited punches. For sufficiently high stakes,
that is, a high enough payoff from humiliating
the other side, the contestants might slug it
out for some time: in an “escalation and
defense” world, there is no Armageddon, but
there is also precious little deterrence or
(further) demand for arms control.
When the Cold War ended, strategic nuclear
weapons, and the attack option in Powell’s
baseline model, remained, so the United
States and Russia never had the opportunity to
bargain under “Star Wars,” defense-dominant
conditions. Brinkmanship, rather than being
relegated to chilling historical memory,
became a real possibility once Russia steadied
itself for a return to major power competition.
As maneuvering ensued with Russia in
Georgia and Ukraine; with China in the South
and East China Seas; and against a potentially
nuclear Iran in the Middle East, the
beleaguered United States seemed at times to
be caught off balance. Just as before, in crises
with a less powerful foe, drawbacks of
brinkmanship surged to the fore. When a
rising power asserted itself in its home region,
even past the point of annexing new territory,
it was not credible that the United States
would respond on its strategic periphery with
nuclear weapons. Accordingly, a raft of new
scholarship gravitated toward flexible
response, now billed as tailored, complex, full

36

For a widely reviewed account of how this nuclear
deterrence logic played against underlying geopolitical
concerns, see Gavin (2012).
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spectrum, layered, or cross-domain
deterrence. 37
In the near term, at least, all variations on the
theme of limited retaliation proved difficult to
effect and infeasible to resource, given
Congress’s sequester of funds to cut the
Federal deficit. Once the sequester was lifted,
maintaining all three legs of the strategic
nuclear triad, upgrading tactical nuclear
weapons such as B61 bombs in Europe, and
improving conventional prompt global strike
still imposed a demanding schedule of
payments, many extra billions of dollars
annually over the next thirty years. 38 This
cost did not include hardening of systems for
space and cyber operations or development of
increasingly sophisticated offensive
capabilities in these new dimensions.
Concepts such as whole of government
response, cross-domain deterrence, and new
generation warfare emerged after significant,
frequently unanticipated setbacks against U.S.
interests in the fifteen years since the Iraq
War. Even if double the money were made
available—one trillion dollars annually and
8% of U.S. GDP—it is unclear, indeed
unlikely, that a plus-up deterrence posture
could cover all necessary contingencies to
achieve escalation dominance.
From the U.S. perspective, which tends to be
that of defender, the difficulty in answering
every call with Powell’s “limited retaliation,”
calibrated escalation crafted to deescalate the
crisis, boils down to two inconvenient factors.
Rivals to the United States, chafing at the
geopolitical status quo, when they hit
resistance in one domain, deftly open a new
37

Payne (2001); Lebovic (2007); Paul, Morgan, and
Wirtz (2009); Harrison, Shackelford, and Jackson
(2009); Lowther (2012); Wenger and Wilner (2012);
Jon Lindsay and Erik Gartzke, “Cross-Domain
Deterrence as a Practical Problem and a Theoretical
Concept,” Draft (July 2016) introduction for Cross-

line of action. Despite U.S. superiority on
paper, in the number and quality of military
systems, the overall impression is yet one of
U.S. interests under assault in key power
centers: Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
In a previous era, either the United States or
the Soviet Union might have put a stop to this
unraveling by ratcheting up the risk of nuclear
war. Today, however, the second strategic
development is that no party, not even the
side that enjoys a preponderance of material
power, can feign the desire to inaugurate a
Cold War-style nuclear showdown. Whether
the putative opponent is Russia, Iran, or
China, the United States has been incapable
of leveraging its superior nuclear arsenal to
defend against cross-domain or hybrid tactics
that erode American regional influence.
The ease of slipping unipolar defense, shifting
one’s offense to a new domain, and the utter
lack of credibility, today, in deterring such an
offense through motions that drag the world
toward nuclear war herald the tardy arrival of
President Reagan’s revolution in deterrence,
though not the way he intended. Nuclear
weapons are poor instruments for deterring
cross-domain coercion everywhere not
because new missile defense technologies can
blast them out of their suborbital trajectory
but because they cannot be invoked to protect
against today’s non-nuclear offenses.
Powell’s accomplishment, which captured
formally the intuition behind great debates of
twentieth-century deterrence, is overtaken by
events. Critical options in his stage game,
limited nuclear retaliation and substantially
raising the risk of nuclear Armageddon, are
gone or at least off the table. A touchstone
Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity
(forthcoming), available at
http://deterrence.ucsd.edu/_files/CDD_Intro_v2.pdf
<<October 20, 2016>>.
38
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model restructuring deterrence, defense, and
arms control after the revolution is simpler if
less intuitive than the standard Cold War
crisis game.
DETERRENCE NOW: A GAME OF
INCHES
After encroachment of competing
states in eastern Europe, Iraq and Syria, and
the South China Sea—all during global
economic recovery and expanding
opportunities for cooperation—the United
States plays a new game (described by an old
model) of low cost attrition. 39 This game
structure challenges the old censoring
assumptions of deterrence for national
security, and it works very differently from
Powell’s version. In the elegant, limiting case
that most forcefully explains the present logic
of competition between nuclear powers, states
vie for a prize of finite value (v); for any
round of the game, each state chooses
whether to continue competing at cost (c) or
quit the contest at zero payoff. When one
state continues a contest as the other state
quits, the enduring state does not pay and
simply receives the prize (v). Both states play
attrition under conditions of relative
symmetry.
While this last presumption is false by
conventional empirical standards of resource
strength, when taking nuclear arsenals and
contextual factors (e.g., the stopping power of
water and rising regionalism) into account,
mathematical simplification actually becomes
more relevant as the world appears ever more
39

Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, 119). This was based
on a model presented by J. Maynard Smith, “The
Theory of Games and Evolution in Animal Conflicts,”
Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol. 47 (1974): 209221.
40
The expression p/(1-p) for odds in economics is
often called the hazard rate (that something good will
fail), and it neatly maps a rising exponential function to
the probability value as p varies from 0 to 1 (Fearon
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multipolar and the cost of continuing multidomain competition drops well below
geopolitical prizes as stake.
Under increasing symmetry, then, both
players in equilibrium quit a contest with the
same low probability (p). For either player
“to be indifferent between staying in for one
more period and stopping now,” payoffs of
two viable courses of action must equate to
one another: 0 = pv - (1-p)c, where zero is the
payoff from quitting and the right side
expression is the expected value of fighting
another round. When the cost of fighting or
extending the geopolitical competition to a
new domain is very low relative to
international stakes, the opponent, indeed
neither side, has high odds of stopping: p/(1p) = c/v. Under conditions of “low c” relative
to v, that is, low cost attrition, the mechanism
of cross-domain coercion—in Europe, the
Middle East, and Asia—is likely to swing like
a frictionless pendulum: the chance (p) of
any party seeing the value in stopping is held
quite low. 40
Without the options of Powell’s classic
deterrence model, that is, without limited
nuclear strike or the willingness to pulse the
risk of nuclear war, the cost of continuing
cross-domain challenges, c, is held low.
Ultra-low cost attrition for the United States
becomes a trap, slow death by a thousand
cuts; resources are not draining dramatically,
but the bleeding never stops. Moreover, just
because general nuclear war is not on the
horizon shaping negotiations or included in
our underlying model does not mean it cannot
1995). In this application, we may appropriately call it
a success rate because it monotonically follows the
probability that players discontinue a costly contest.
When c/v is low, state-actors enter a new world in
which the hazard rate (in this instance the chance for
success) is low. Something bad, the attrition war, will
not end; it will go on unless players find a way to
manipulate the key parameter, c/v.
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happen. Time is not on anyone’s side.
Eventually, due to misperception or an
irrational move (outside the attrition or
escalation models), nuclear powers could
abruptly return to Powell’s deterrence
framework and find themselves in a Cubastyle missile crisis.
If so, it will be too late, then, for them to
exploit one possible route out of the low-cost
attrition trap. During the ancien regime of
nuclear deterrence, policy makers thought in
sequence: deterrence, defense, and then arms
control. In the new world, cross-domain
attrition promises a revolution in this
relationship: arms control, defense, and then
deterrence. This is because annual halftrillion dollar efforts to modernize
conventional defenses under the third offset
or refurbish and replace the nuclear deterrent
do not budge the underlying parameter, c, in
the way they once did. Despite substantial
commitments to force structure and nuclear
posture, regional adversaries with global
reach can at low cost continue to challenge
the status quo by touching levers of power
across domains, from North Korea nuclear
testing to energy prices and climate change.
The ticket to play another round of
geopolitical attrition in the new global politics
is unfortunately quite affordable for all sides.

common external challenges, which accrue
only when the attrition game ends. 41 The
geopolitical stakes (v) of broader conflict go
down if winning the original prize entails loss
of benefits from stillborn defense cooperation.
In the foundational logic of low cost attrition,
as v, the value of winning a spat, declines, c/v,
and therefore the probability of success (that
is, stopping the wasteful contest), rises for
both sides.
Cross-domain conflict in the world today
presents several stubborn characteristics that
visionary political scientist Samuel
Huntington outlined twenty years ago in
Clash of Civilizations. 42 Huntington’s book
responded to what he warned was
wrongheaded, or at least incomplete,
speculation about the end of ideology as the
“end of history,” a transcendent condition
when differences among states and the
distribution of nuclear capability mattered less
and all parties resigned themselves to
competition according to globalized rules of
the game designed for promoting
commerce. 43

Nevertheless, even with additional
conventional defense and traditional
deterrence sidelined for winning this type of
game, the potential for innovation and
progress in arms control remains. This is
because arms control, particularly when it
manifests as cooperative defense, does not
have to disarm or reduce threat potential in
order to be effective; rather it can provide a
mutual stream of benefits, in technological
exchange or in burdensharing against

Huntington warned that when the clash
between communism and liberalism wound
down, this did not mean that American-led
liberal order would run on its own
momentum. Potential for resistance, even
great power conflict, interrupting progress of
international relations, remained strong. 44
Civilizations structured along common
language, religion, and preferential commerce
continued to spread from cultural hearths
under globalization, reinforcing regional
identities that could flood across conventional
nation-state boundaries much as ideology had
during the Cold War. Powerful nation-states,
however, would not disappear. Regional
champions, Huntington predicted, could

41

42

Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner (1992).
Contemporary arguments include Koblentz (2014),
Steer (2017), and Rose (2018).

Huntington (1998).
Fukuyama (1993).
44
Mearsheimer (2001).
43
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polarize local identities, bend them along
civilizational lines, and mobilize them for
grand strategies, overcoming material deficits
to challenge American hegemony.
All this coheres with contemporary security
challenges against the United States at world
power centers and helps explain why the
United States is keen to revisit and reinforce
deterrence, now. A generation ago,
Huntington moderated his doom and gloom.
Cataclysmic deterrence breakdown and
conflict among nuclear champions,
particularly in the form of an anti-Western
alliance against the United States, was not a
foregone conclusion. Avoiding catastrophe,
though, would demand prudential decisions
from the West to figure how to accommodate
rising power of the Rest. 45 Huntington’s
ideas about emerging world disorder and
prescriptions to find areas of cooperation
were heavily discounted immediately after
9/11, when they seemed to conflate the U.S.led War on Terror with a nightmarish Western
Crusade against Islam. Today, we ignore at
our peril the rise of regional champions,
international identity politics, and the
potential for a defense strategy that leads with
practical accommodation.
Huntington, of course, did not foresee
concurrent innovations below the grand
strategic level in multi-domain operations and
cross-domain coercion. These developments
make multiple deterrence challenges for the
United States more difficult, but they, too,
may be accommodated if, beyond Powell
(1990), policy makers recognize a new
political economy of their situation. The
United States’ game-theoretic best response
given its role as status quo power
acknowledges a revolution in deterrence,
defense, and arms control. Novel arms
control, moving from emphasis on
disarmament, closer toward cooperative
45

Zakaria (2008); Kupchan (2012); Rose (2013).
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defense that institutionalizes mutual benefits
of strategic stability, may, instead of trailing,
now strike a path toward strengthened
deterrence and effective defense of the
national interest.
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August, 2012- President Obama drew
a “Red Line” on chemical weapons use in
Syria. 1 Just over a year later, a UN report
confirmed Syrian chemical use. Two words,
spoken by the most powerful man in the
world, generated massive media coverage.
Around the world, news outlets and people
everywhere looked for Washington’s reaction.
Words are powerful because of the narrative
they create; framing how people see the
world. When a powerful enough frame is
used, it sways people’s views of the world,
changing policy by extension. The words the
President spoke were powerful because they
created a frame for the issue of Syria. People
the world over recognized the frame, thereby
giving it power.
The media frame the way many see the world;
this paper examines the extent of this frame.
This paper examines the question, “What
drives public support for military intervention
in humanitarian crises?” This paper uses the
similar systems model to evaluate the
difference in public support for intervention
using Kosovo and Syria as case studies.
Media coverage and public support for
intervention is contextualized by significant
strategic events. This paper uses the common
variables between Kosovo and Syria to
isolates the variables which are different and
might be responsible the difference in results.
1

Laura Olson, USAFA ’17, is Second Lieutenant in the
U.S. Air Force.
2
Ole R. Holsti, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy:
Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus,

In the proper context, strategic changes to US
policy can be self-reinforcing in terms of
popular support. These actions must echo in
the public memory, invoking association with
previous positive policies. This echo in turn
drives an increase in media exposure, on the
issue in question, further increasing public
support regardless of the nature of the
exposure.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Because of the large role public
opinion plays in the policy making process, it
has been the source of extensive political
science research. This paper evaluates two
variant elements regarding past literature on
public opinion. The first element is whether
public opinion is reasonable and rational, or
easily manipulated and unstable. The second
is, to what extent do the way media frame
their coverage give shape to public opinion.
There are two perspectives on public opinion
which merit consideration. On one side lies
the Almond-Lippmann Consensus, which
holds that public opinion is volatile and
unreliable. 2 Alternatively, a number of
scholars believe that the public responds to
information and events in a logical and

Mershon Series: Research Programs and
Debates," International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 4
(December 1992): 441, accessed April 15, 2017,
JSTOR.
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rational way. 3 The Almond-Lippmann
Consensus arose in the decades after WWII,
based on the concurring opinions of Walter
Lippmann and Gabriel Almond. Walter
Lippmann’s argument is rooted in his 1922
work, where he advanced the thesis that the
public is strictly focused on its immediate
needs and has neither the time, nor interest to
understand international politics. 4 In the years
after WWII, he expanded his argument,
stating that public opinion was not just
uninformed, but was so off track it was
dangerous:
“The unhappy truth is that the prevailing
public opinion has been destructively wrong
at the critical junctures. The people have
impressed a critical veto upon the judgments
of informed and responsible officials… Mass
opinion has acquired mounting power in this
country. It has shown itself to be a dangerous
master of decision when the stakes are life
and death.” 5

Consensus and the basis for one school of
thought on public opinion. This consensus
held sway throughout the 50s and 60s and
counted many influential supporters in its
ranks. Hans J. Morgenthau and George F.
Kennan, 8 the source of the American policy
of containment both supported this school of
thought. 9
A number of scholars challenged the AlmondLippmann Consensus, citing the advances in
public opinion research since the end of the
Vietnam War, as well as numerous studies
which prove stability in public opinion. 10
Shapiro and Page found that public opinion
towards foreign policy changed in response to
“international and domestic events that have
been reported and interpreted by the mass
media and by policymakers and other
elites.” 11 This school of thought has gained
more traction in recent years, causing the
focus to shift to the role that the media play in
public opinion and the implications of their
role.

Gabriel Almond came to similar conclusions,
warning against the volatility of public moods
and “cyclical fluctuations which stand in the
way of policy stability.” 6 His 1956 article was
written in Lippmann’s style and created the
basis for “mood theory,” which stated that
public opinion was volatile and easily
impacted. According to his theory, if public
opinion is easily influenced, it should play no
role in politics. 7 Together, Almond and
Lipmann form the Almond-Lippmann

The role of the media in public opinion is
known as framing, and is considered one
determiner of public opinion. A frame aims to
reorient a person’s thinking towards an
issue, 12 Nelson and Kinder define a frame as,
“[A frame determines] how [an issue] should
be thought about, and may go so far as to
recommend what (if anything) should be
done.” 13 Chong and Druckman define it as
the following: “Framing refers to the process

3
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Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion, (London: Allen
and Unwin), 1922.
5
Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public
Philosophy, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1951), 20.
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Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign
Policy, (New York: Praeger. 1950), 85.
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Security Policy," Public Opinion Quarterly 20, no. 2
(1956): 239, accessed April 15, 2017.

George Kennan, American Diplomacy, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1951). 1900-1 950.
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Holsti, 443.
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Ibid.
11
Shapiro and Page, 211.
12
Dennis Chong and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias,
"Managing Voter Ambivalence in Growth and
Conservation Campaigns," Ambivalence, Politics and
Public Policy, (2005), 104 accessed April 15, 2017.
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Thomas E. Nelson and Donald R. Kinder, "Issue
Frames and Group-Centrism in American Public
Opinion," The Journal of Politics 58, no. 4 (1996):
1055-1078.
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by which people develop a particular
conceptualization of an issue or reorient their
thinking about an issue.” 14
The “CNN effect” is a specific type of media
framing intended to mobilize support for
humanitarian intervention. 15 Supporters of the
“CNN effect” perspective believe that media
framing of humanitarian crises is directly
responsible for public support for
humanitarian intervention. 16 Scholars,
however, disagree on its public opinion
impact. US intervention in Somalia, which is
frequently cited as a case study for this claim,
remains under contention. The CNN effect’s
ability to mobilize public support is well
documented and can mobilize public
support. 17 Other agencies, specifically human
rights organizations, play a major role in
drawing attention to and pressuring Western
governments to intervene through ‘human
rights shaming’. They draw attention to the
worst human rights violations and mobilize
interventional efforts. 18 Alternatively, there is
evidence that people choose the frames which
are consistent with what they believe, 19
instead of being dictated to by outside
sources. 20 The emotional connection to the
frame, then, is more important than the
content of the frame. The news media
14

Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman, "Framing
Theory," Annual Review of Political Science 10, no. 1
(2007): 104, accessed April 16, 2017.
15
Alynna J Lyon. “Global Good Samaritans: When Do
We Heed 'the Responsibility to Protect'?” Irish Studies
in International Affairs 20, (2009): 45, accessed
November 12, 2015.
16
Amanda Murdie and Dursun Peksen, "The Impact of
Human Rights INGO Shaming on Humanitarian
Interventions," The Journal of Politics 76, no. 1
(2013): 216, accessed November 12, 2015.
17
Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “National Interest,
Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace
Enforcement After the Cold War?”. Journal of Peace
Research 33, no 2 (1996): accessed 11 November
2015.
18
Amanda Murdie and Dursun Peksen, 216.
19
P. M Sniderman S. M. Theriault. The Structure of
Political Argument and the Logic of Issue Framing. In
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subsequently plays no real role in fostering
public support for military intervention.
Another possible reason for public support for
military intervention has no specific name,
but will be called the public’s collective
memory for the sake of this paper. “Vietnam
Syndrome” is a well-documented effect in
which Americans view conflict in the light of
past conflict. 21 While most commonly
associated with wars, collective memory also
encompasses military intervention. It is
impacted by the political climate of the time,
which is in turn impacted by previous
interventions or their absences. For example,
US intervention in Somalia was a reason why
the US refrained from intervention in
Rwanda. 22 Humanity’s failure in Rwanda,
prompted intervention in Kosovo. 23 The
resultant struggle to direct and redirect action
can be seen in public opinion and its
influences, 24 although advocacy groups
frequently pressure the government directly,
instead of working through the public
sentiment. 25
Of the schools of thought considered here, the
argument that affirms public opinion is stable
and based on logical conclusions, appears to
make the stronger argument. More difficult is
W. E. Saris & P. M. Sniderman (Eds.) Studies in Public
Opinion Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2004. 133–165.
20
Nelson and Kinder.
21
Kurt Jacobsen, "Afghanistan and the Vietnam
Syndrome," Economic and Political Weekly 36, no. 44
(2001): 4182-183.
22
Jon Western and Joshua S. Goldstein, “Humanitarian
Intervention Comes of Age: Lessons from Somalia to
Libya,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 4 (2011): 48–59,
accessed November 12, 2015
23
Lyon, 44.
24
Eric A Heinze, “The Rhetoric of Genocide in U.S.
Foreign Policy: Rwanda and Darfur
Compared,” Political Science Quarterly 122 no. 3,
(2007): 373.
25
Scott Straus, “Darfur and the Genocide
Debate”. Foreign Affairs 84, no. 1 (2005): 125,
accessed November 12, 2015.
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to judge whether collective memory or media
framing is a larger determiner of public
opinion towards intervention.
According to past research, this paper expects
some combination of the variables just
described. The first possibility is that the
public opinion data are reasonable and
rational or easily manipulated and unstable,
reinforcing the Almond-Lippmann
Consensus. Alternatively, should the results
prove public opinion reliable, the cause for
the different public opinion results between
the case studies could be caused by media
framing, collective public memory, or some
combination of the two. Framing literature
contains both supporting and contradicting
theories, making this paper a valuable
contribution to the field. Most literature is
concerned with the impact of public opinion
on the decision to intervene, rather than what
influences public opinion. The lack of
literature on this topic is likely because public
opinion research frequently falls into the area
of sociology. Examining the political science
side of the question offers a fresh perspective
to issues already researched extensively.

reaction. This study predicts that either media
framing or collective memory is responsible
for the changes seen in public opinion.
Popular support for air strikes and ground
forces, the dependent variable, is evaluated
against the volume and type of media
coverage for each crisis, the independent
variable.
Kosovo and Syria were selected as case
studies in this paper because of their
similarities, and because both represent cases
where the United States took action, making
them positive case studies. Humanitarian
crises in which the United States intervened
were necessary to ensure data availability and
issue salience for the American people.
The similar systems approach chooses case
studies which have different results despite a
great number of similarities. This study will
explain the difference in the results by finding
the variables which are inconsistent between
the two cases.

Elite framing of issues has been tied to
US public opinion by scholars for decades. 26
It is widely accepted that media portrayal,
slanted one way or another, changes how
people view issues. The literature examined
presents opposing interpretations for whether
ignorance and capriciousness render public
opinion useless as a metric. This paper
utilizes the most similar systems model using
Kosovo and Syria as case studies because of
their mulitfactoral parallels: religiously
motivated conflict, autocratic styles of
government, United States reaction, NATO

Public opinion is evaluated by analyzing
polling data for each crisis. These polls were
obtained through iPOLL Databank from the
Roper Center for Public Opinion Research
and the Pew Research archives. Because the
public support for intervention differed
significantly depending on the type of
intervention, the two most common forms of
intervention, airstrikes and ground forces,
were selected to illustrate trends in public
support rather than a specific intervention.
Similarly worded questions were grouped
together, creating some variability in
responses. John Zaller’s suppositional work
on public opinion argues that even minor
changes in wording can create large changes
in the poll responder. 27 This study attempts to
take the data variation into account, but it is

26

27
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possible that media framing has no impact on
public opinion. There were still large gaps in
poll data where no polls were found. Where
gaps existed because no polls had been
conducted, the data were extrapolated to the
next data point. Data are presented on a
monthly basis, over a period of two years for
Kosovo and four years for Syria. When more
than one study was available, the results were
averaged to present all of the information.
Using such long periods of data collection and
inference also introduces error when public
opinion changes throughout the month due to
significant events.
The independent variable, media framing, was
operationalized by counting the frequency
with which certain key words appeared in the
media each month. The New York Times was
used as the media source because it sets the
agenda for other news agencies. 28 This study
tracked key words which connote the need to
intervene, versus words that would suggest
the opposite. The goal was to determine how
the New York Times framed the Syrian and
Kosovo narrative, and to analogize popular
response in determination of a framing effect.
The words, “civil war,” “civil unrest,”
“internal conflict,” and “faction”, were
aggregated to portray a frame discouraging
intervention. Traditionally, the United States
has resisted becoming embroiled in the
internal disputes of sovereign nations, a
concept deeply engrained since the days of
isolationism in the 1930s. 29
The positive words which were intended to
indicate a framing that encourages
intervention, were “massacre,” “suffering,”
“genocide,” “ethnic cleansing,” “famine,” and
“genocide,” and “US obligation”. The
appearance of any of these words was
28

Guy Golan, "Inter-Media Agenda Setting and Global
News Coverage," Journalism Studies 7, no. 2
(February 17, 2007): 323, accessed April 17, 2017.

82

believed to connote a humanitarian obligation
to intervene.
The data are presented chronologically in a
graph (Fig. 1), contextualized by key events
in each crisis. These key events were selected
based on their perceived impact on public
opinion, occurring right before large spikes or
plunges in data.
FINDINGS
Despite the many similarities in the
Kosovo and Syria crises, support for
intervention varied greatly, indicated in
Figure 1. The goal of this study is to isolate
the variable responsible for the difference in
results seen between the two cases.
A causal and interdependent relationship
appears between media coverage, government
action, and public opinion, common across
Kosovo and Syrian cases. Among the factors
relating Kosovo and Syria is the complex
relationship between government policies, the
media, and public opinion. The media drives
public opinion, but is influenced indirectly by
government policies. Public opinion, although
impacted by the frequency of exposure to
certain frames, is also influenced heavily by
memory and context of previous
governmental policies. This trinity while
perhaps intuitive in hindsight, often combines
to have unforeseeable results. This
relationship establishes not just common
variables between cases, but a common
interaction between media coverage, public
opinion, and government policy change.
These three variables share a complex
relationship, with each component fueling the
others. Public opinion feeds on media
29

John Milton. Cooper, The Vanity of Power;
American Isolationism and the First World War, 19141917 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Pub. Corp., 1969),
271.
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coverage, which follows the stories. The most
interesting media fodder is provided by
internet conjectures, coverage of American
strategic changes, and military action. The
government ultimately answers to the people
for any action it takes, and hopes for approval
in serious strategic shifts. For example, public
opinion would not support direct action in
Syria after Assad’s use of chemical weapons.
Then, in response to the “Red Line” breach,
President Obama bequeathed the decision to a
hostile congress, who effectively killed any
possibility for intervention. In Kosovo,
airstrikes generated more media coverage,
focusing the public’s attention on the area,
causing them to support it- until it cost them
something. After public opinion turned
against airstrikes, the government advocated
for ground troops which enjoyed a higher
approval rating. The three variables act;
sometimes concurringly, and sometimes
opposingly.
The similarities between cases go beyond
their surface commonalities. Both countries
have autocratic governments struggling with
religiously motivated internal division. The
former Yugoslav Republic, which once
counted Kosovo as a part of its territory was
majority ethnic Albanian, and resentment
towards its Serbian rulers still rans deep.
Syria’s internal conflict revolves around proAssad forces, ISIS, and a rebel group, all of
them hostile to the others. The source of the
conflict in Yugoslavia was ethnic and
religious between Muslim Albanians and
Orthodox Serbs. In Syria the source was
religious divisions among Sunni and Shi’ite
Muslims. The Polity IV Project qualified
Yugoslavia as an autocracy throughout the
Kosovo crisis. Although data cuts off in 2013,
the Polity Project has defined Syria as
autocratic since 1970. 30
30

Monty Marshall, "Polity IV Project: Political Regime
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013," Polity IV
Project,

Not only are Kosovo and Syria very similar in
their internal politics, but the United States’
reaction was similar as well. In both cases the
United States joined coalition air strikes and
considered using ground troops, but no
ground troops were actually deployed.
This paper examines if media framing or
collective memory could be the variable
which explains the differences in public
opinion.
MEDIA FRAMING
Media framing is expected to explain
the different public opinion reactions to the
similar cases of Syria and Kosovo. This
section is dedicated to analyzing media
framing and collective memory to explain the
changes to public support for military
intervention in Syria and then Kosovo. The
correlation between media coverage and
public support is more nuanced than expected.
When research began, a direct correlation
between public opinion and the frequency of
key words in the media was anticipated.
Beyond this initial expectation, support for
intervention and an increase in words like
“genocide” and “suffering” appeared in the
media indicating a framing effect was also
expected. There should have been an inverse
correlation with the appearance of words like
“civil unrest” and “civil war”, both of which
imply that the conflict was between internal
parties. This approach to the study was based
in the perception that Americans see it as their
responsibility to relieve suffering and prevent
genocide, while they resist any effort to
intervene in the affairs of sovereign nations.
In the Syria case study the key events which
precede a major change in both public opinion
and media coverage are the “Red Line,”
June 5, 2014, accessed April 24, 2017.
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drawn in July, 2012; UN confirmed chemical
weapons use in September, 2013. ISIS
declared a caliphate in June of 2014 and
rapidly expanded through Iraq and Syria in
the following months. Its expansion prompted
the first coalition airstrikes two months later.
Russian airstrikes commenced a year later.
See Figure 2.
This section compares each individual data
line to public support for intervention. Upon
examination of the graph, shown in Figure 3,
three major spikes push the frequency scale
over 200, Syrian President Assad’s chemical
weapons use, and the declaration of an
Islamic Caliphate. Then there are minor
media spikes of near one hundred. It happens
that major shifts in US policy or in the
strategic landscape correlate directly to the
spikes in media coverage, which in turn relate
directly to changes in public opinion. There is
a trend of minor spikes in news coverage,
followed by a reactionary major spike. A
tertiary spike occurs in April of 2013, when
President Obama declares a “Red Line” on
chemical weapons in Syria. A major spike
occurs in September of the same year after
Assad uses chemical weapons, and the world
looks to United States for a response to the
“Red Line” violation. Minor spikes occur
when ISIS seizes Raqqa, its first major city, in
January of 2014; and when it takes Mosul and
Takrit, in June of the same year. The
secondary reactionary spike does not occur
until the United States launches its first
airstrikes, in September of 2014. The same
pattern is seen in April of 2015 when ISIS’
loss of Takrit is overshadowed by the reaction
to Russian airstrikes in September of 2015. In
each case, a major strategic change caused by
the United States; and later, Russia, is the
greatest generator of media coverage.
Ultimately, there appears to be no clear
correlation that indicates a framing narrative
pushed by the media and adopted by the
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public. Indeed, there appears to be a positive
correlation between mentions of civil war and
the public’s willingness to intervene,
demonstrated back in Figure 2. Indeed, the
two results appear to be flipped, with a greater
positive correlation shown by the negative
framing, and a greater negative correlation
seen in the positive framing. Consequently,
there appears to be no direct impact of media
framing on public opinion. From the figure
discussed above, it is clear that there is no
direct correlation between the type of
coverage and the response in public opinion.
The most compelling narrative occurs when
considering the aggregate media attention in
Syria explained by significant strategic
events, demonstrated in Figure 3. Since the
value based framing appears to be ineffective
in predicting public opinion, consideration of
frequency based framing is warranted.
Examining aggregate media coverage better
reflects public support for intervention, with
the obvious exception of the chemical
weapons use in 2013.
A challenge with the data presented is the
lack of consistent polling data. There were
large gaps in the data during which no polling
was conducted. Where data existed, as many
as five polls in one month asked nearly
identical questions, indicating sporadic
periods of intense interest followed by
nothing. Although Syria was chosen as case
study because of the availability of polling
data and issue salience (indicated in Figure 3),
it is still far from complete. Its absence means
that this study, lacking precision, could have
been made more complete had more evenly
spaced polls been conducted.
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KOSOVO
The representation of data shows the
same patterning trends of key political or
military events followed by a spike in media
coverage. The spike in coverage then leads a
subsequent change in public opinion. This
representation in the Syria case study appears
to apply to Kosovo as well, Figure 4. Though
January 1998, is the graphical starting point,
however, hostilities between Yugoslav and
Albanian Kosovars began long before 1998,
when the first Kosovars were killed. The
historical chronicling of events began when
the Kosovars, who ruled with autonomy,
came into conflict with Slobodan Milosevic,
the president of Serbia. Milošević, the
president of Serbia and Yugoslavia, began
restricting their freedoms, and enflamed
ethnic tension, already heightened by the
breakup of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the mid1990s. As Kosovo strained for its
independence, Yugoslavia was determined to
keep its, which heralded a bloody two years
that would pull in many of the world’s major
powers.
January 1998- Ninety Kosovars die, victim of
Serbian attacks. In reaction, theUN passes
Resolution 1160, imposing an arms embargo
on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia until
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
Kosovar-Albanians open a dialog and the
Serbs remove their troops from Kosovo. This
generates initial public interest in the region;
however, tensions continue to escalate despite
the efforts of Europe.
While Syria’s events are driven by dramatic
events, Kosovo is the story of country slowly
boiling over. The Kosovo situation slowly
deteriorates as refugee numbers mount to
300,000 Kosovars, and NATO fighters
conduct aerial demonstrations. Finally,
NATO authorizes airstrikes in October, which
causes a small spike in soon to be dissipated

public attention. Collapsing peace talks, the
mal-targeted NATO air campaign—which
bombs a civilian train killing twenty, and a
refugee convoy killing an additional seventy
civilians—generates even more attention.
However, these news-worthy events are not
associated with a drop in public opinion—
rather support for air strikes continues to grow
independent of media framing, as seen in
March 1999, Figure 5.
Next, support for ground troops, though
initially higher than that toward air strikes,
drops as the level of the air campaign
expands. The correlating historical record
shows that in April alone, 400 additional
airplanes were requested to support the
bombing campaign. Conversely, public
support for airstrikes falls off dramatically
after an Apache crash sees two American
casualties. An additional survey asked people
if they would be willing to sustain casualties
in the Kosovo situation. Before the crash,
78% said they would; after the crash, that
number fell by almost half. Americans were
willing to support Kosovo with treasure, but
guarded blood jealously. Not detailed in the
graph, but important to the validity of public
opinion as a metric was overall awareness of
the Kosovo crisis. Far from being ignorant of
the issues, before airstrikes were conducted, a
third of Americans were following the issue.
After America engages in the air campaign,
the involved number rises to almost 90
percent.
Besides the concurring spikes in December,
1998 caused by the Yugoslav and Serbian
forces breaking the cease-fire, the media antiintervention and the media pro-intervention
frame appear to occur independently, as
opposed to Syria where they were directly
correlated. Different results between case
studies would normally mean that the variable
explains the difference in results. However, in
this case, the difference does not appear to
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correlate to changes in public opinion. Rather
it relates to overall media coverage, as shown
in Figure 4.
DISCUSSION
This study finds that the public’s
opinions logically follow events and that the
more the United States is invested in an area,
the more people become interested in the
region. These findings that public opinion is
stable and well-reasoned do directly
contradict the “Almond-Lippmann
Consensus”. Within the realms of this study
public opinion as a metric has been validated,
therefore remains the question: What drives
public support for military intervention?
Some think that media frames determine the
public’s opinion, rather, we see that the
media’s role is to shine a light on issues
frequently determined by the government.
The “CNN effect,” then, does not change
public opinion instead, it is how the people
see humanitarian crises in the context of
previous conflicts that changes public
opinion. Also conclusively greater total
coverage had a greater influence on public
opinion. The media can direct the focus of the
public, but has little power to influence its
opinions. Whether this is because people
choose frames for emotional reasons, as the
literature suggests, is outside the declared
realm of this study. However, it could be the
focus of future research.
Treated as isolated incidences, the public
reactions to Kosovo and Syria appear to be
random, but taken in the context of previous
US interventions, the public’s reaction is
completely logical. President Obama’s “Red
Line” and Assad’s subsequent use of
chemical weapons is eerily similar to
Saddam’s use of chemical weapons against
the Kurds, which brought about the First Gulf
War. In even more recent memory is the 2003
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invasion of Iraq, which was precipitated by
outrage against weapons of mass destruction.
The lack of an American response to the
violation of our “Red Line,” is consistent with
the literature’s support that the success of past
interventions impacts the likelihood of future
interventions. The public loosely categorizes
American interventions abroad. As an
example, Iraq was reminiscent of the First
Gulf War, which was hugely successful.
However, Syria is reminiscent of Iraq, which
resulted in a decade long war without a
successful outcome. In the people’s eyes, ISIS
is an extension of American policy failures in
Iraq. Instead of seeing evil and trying to fix it,
the public sees Syria as another Iraq waiting
to happen.
Similarly, Russia’s use of airstrikes in Syria
brings back the eerie specter of the Cold War,
a narrative made more compelling by Russian
aggression in other areas. When Russia
launched airstrikes in September of 2015,
support for airstrikes specifically began to
drop, falling off significantly, as media
coverage of the skirmish decreased towards
the middle of 2016.
With all other variables nearly identical, the
difference between Syria and Kosovo was
casualties. Kosovo was strongly reminiscent
of Somalia, as the internal conflict and
disproportionate level of media coverage can
attest. The internal conflict with international
mediators and UN intervention from the
beginning, reminded Americans of what can
happen when they send their sons and
daughters overseas. It was for this reason that
support for a NATO air campaign was so
strong. When the phrasing of the polling
questions changed to ask about unilateral
action, support dropped by as many as twenty
percentage points. As soon as Americans
died, so did the support for that military
action.
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That support for airstrikes fell in Kosovo
indicates that the connection to Somalia had
been made. Americans were utterly casualty
adverse. Simultaneously, the connection to
Somalia was not completely formed,
indicated by the remaining support for
peacekeeping ground forces. Instead it
appears that casualties invoked the collective
memory of Somalia, and immediately
changed public opinion and ultimately
American policy.

Surely it is no secret to our government that
American deaths bring both support and
opposition to bear in international policies; it
continues to be the government’s job to justly
protect and judiciously support. By extension,
policies should never be made to sacrifice
lives to change support for intervention.
Though the media may focus attention like
shining a flashlight on a vignette for a
moment, it loses no lives, and sends no sons
or daughters into harm’s way.

The responses to published opinion and
public record of historical events should not
be viewed as the only factors when
international conflicts are happening in real
time. Data points and data spikes cannot
account for the knowledge known by actors at
each point in the cycle of a crisis. Deeper
correlations and causations may yet be
brought to bear on recent history when
revelations, and clearances time out.

Masked by sterile language and analysis, yet
present throughout in the examples of Syria
and Kosovo is another hideous truth: the
morality of the public exists only until it is
asked to sacrifice. For it is far easier to weep
for the deaths of millions and call for
intervention, knowing it will not happen, than
it is to sacrifice your sons and daughters by
the hundreds and thousands for an abstract
ideal. Perhaps, this then is the difference
between those who commit genocide and
those who stand and do nothing. One side will
kill for their ideal, but the other, though it
weeps, will not be slain to promote their own.

CONCLUSION
The government has the tremendous
ability to shape public opinion and media
through its policy. The government sets the
agenda, and the media follows. The complex
relationship between public opinion,
government action, and the media provides
the backbone of the similarities between
cases, but the ultimate determiner of public
opinion is the people themselves. The ideas
and distillations of opinion leak out into not
only polls and newspapers, but also into blogs
and other social media. In fact, the media in
all of its varying forms, acts as a conduit and
catalyzer of public opinion, giving it a type of
power. That power is far less than were it able
to directly influence public opinion through
specific frames. When all other variables are
accounted for, it is the deaths of American
servicemen in Kosovo that changed public
opinion, summoning other frames of a similar
helicopter crash just a few years prior.
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Kosovo Support for Intervention

Syria Support for Intervention
Figure 1. Comparative public support for Kosovo and Syrian intervention.
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Figure 2. Positive and negative media framing for Syria versus support for military intervention.

Figure 3. Aggregate media coverage, public support for intervention, with issue salience.
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Figure 4. Overview of Kosovo media coverage and public support for military intervention.

Figure 5. Positive and negative media framing for Syria versus support for military intervention.
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